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The U.S. Supreme Court—thanks to various statutes passed by Congress
beginning in 1891 and culminating in 1988—currently enjoys nearly unfettered discretion to set its docket using the writ of certiorari. Over the past few
decades, concerns have mounted that the Court has been taking the wrong mix
of cases, hearing too few cases, and relying too heavily on law clerks in the certiorari process. Scholars, in turn, have proposed fairly sweeping reforms, such
as the creation of a certiorari division to handle certiorari petitions. This Ar†
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ticle argues that before the Court’s discretion to set its own agenda is taken
away, another area of the law—one that already has thought long and hard
about how to constrain delegated discretion—should be consulted: administrative law. Although certiorari and administrative law certainly differ, both involve congressional delegations of discretion to a less accountable body and
therefore both raise concerns of accountability, transparency, and reasoned decisionmaking. Accordingly, in considering certiorari reform, it makes sense to
borrow from some of administrative law’s well-developed lessons about how delegated discretion can be controlled. Specifically, after consulting the nondelegation doctrine, reason-giving requirements, public participation mechanisms,
and oversight principles found in administrative law, this Article concludes
that vote-disclosure requirements and increased public participation stand as
promising ways of checking the Court’s currently unconstrained discretion.
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INTRODUCTION
The U.S. Supreme Court today enjoys nearly unfettered discretion
1
to choose which cases to hear via the discretionary writ of certiorari.
Various statutes enacted by Congress from 1891 to 1988 almost entirely eliminated the Court’s obligatory jurisdiction and delegated to the
Court the task of setting its agenda. Thanks to these changes, the
Court no longer operates in a world where the Court, in the words of
Chief Justice John Marshall, had “no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which is given, than to usurp that which is not giv2
en.” Rather, the Court today enjoys broad discretion to decide which
cases warrant the Court’s time, routinely granting certiorari in only
3
about one percent of all petitions received each term.
1

Cf. Edward A. Hartnett, Questioning Certiorari: Some Reflections Seventy-Five Years
After the Judges’ Bill, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 1643, 1645 (2000) (“[W]e have grown accustomed to the idea that the Supreme Court sets its own agenda, and tend to take it for
granted.” (footnote omitted)).
2
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
3
See EUGENE GRESSMAN ET AL., SUPREME COURT PRACTICE 321 (9th ed. 2007)
(“During the nine terms from 1992 to 2002, the Court granted 1.19 percent of the certiorari petitions filed.”); see also The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, 123 HARV.
L. REV. 382, 389 (2009) (noting that the Court granted review in 87 cases on the
Court’s appellate docket out of 7868 total petitions, leading to a 1.1% grant rate); The
Supreme Court, 2007 Term—The Statistics, 122 HARV. L. REV. 516, 523 (2008) (noting that
the Court granted review in 95 cases on the Court’s appellate docket out of 8374 total
petitions, also leading to a 1.1% grant rate). If only paid petitions are considered, the
grant rate goes up, whereas if only in forma pauperis petitions are considered, the
grant rate goes down. See, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2008 Term—The Statistics, supra, at
389 (noting that 4.7% of paid petitions were granted, compared to only 0.1% of in
forma pauperis petitions).
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In choosing which cases will win a prized slot on the docket, the
Court operates outside of the public eye and under a cloak of secrecy.
The Court, for example, generally does not explain why a particular
4
case will or will not be heard. Nor does the Court routinely disclose
5
individual Justices’ votes on certiorari petitions. In addition, the
Court makes its certiorari decisions free of any constraining legislative
criteria that might differentiate those cases that merit certiorari from
6
those that do not.
In light of the sweeping discretion that the Court enjoys and the
7
importance of the Court’s docket-setting powers, it is not at all surprising that certiorari has been criticized. For example, Sanford Levinson recently commented that “there are overtones—given the extent of discretion enjoyed by the Court—of southern sheriffs during
the 1960s in having the authority to allow (or disallow) parades or
demonstrations based on broad, unhelpful ‘standards’ and, ultimately,
8
on what occasionally seems to be whim.” Edward Hartnett has questioned whether the Court’s broad discretion to set its own agenda can
be squared with “classic conceptions of judicial review, judicial power,
9
and the rule of law.” In addition, two scholars of the Court have
noted that “[t]he most striking feature of the [certiorari] process is
that it lacks most of the trappings of traditional judicial decisionmak4

See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 88-91 and accompanying text.
6
See infra subsections III.A.1-2.
7
See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., The National Court of Appeals, 40 U. CHI. L. REV.
473, 482 (1973) (“[T]he screening function is inextricably linked to the fulfillment of
the Court’s essential duties and is vital to the effective performance of the Court’s
unique mission ‘to define [and vindicate] the rights guaranteed by the Constitution, to
assure the uniformity of federal law, and to maintain the constitutional distribution of
powers in our federal union.’” (quoting FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY
GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE SUPREME COURT (1972), reprinted in 57 F.R.D. 573,
578 (1972) [hereinafter FREUND REPORT])); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard
Cordray, The Philosophy of Certiorari: Jurisprudential Considerations in Supreme Court Case
Selection, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 389, 397 (2004) [hereinafter Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy
of Certiorari] (“Given the many levels on which the Court’s case-selection decisions impact its work, its role, and its image, decisionmaking at the threshold stage may be
second to none in importance.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection: The Relationship Between Certiorari and the Merits, 69 OHIO ST. L.J. 1, 1 (2008) [hereinafter Cordray &
Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection] (noting that certiorari is “[o]ne of the
most critical aspects of the Supreme Court’s work”).
8
Sanford Levinson, Assessing the Supreme Court’s Current Caseload: A Question of Law
or Politics?, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 99, 101 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/02/
01/levinson.html.
9
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1647.
5
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ing—collegial deliberation, constraining criteria, majority rule, and
10
public accountability.”
What is surprising, however, is that scholars who have criticized
certiorari and considered possible means of reform generally have focused on forcing the Court to hear certain kinds of cases or to hear
11
more cases, or alternatively on taking discretion away from the Court
12
and giving it to some other body like a certiorari division. Accordingly, scholars generally have not focused on the source of the Court’s
discretion (namely, delegations from Congress) and how that delegated discretion might be cabined or checked. In particular, scholars
have failed to look to the lessons of another area of the law that has
already thought long and hard about how to control delegated discre13
tion: administrative law. That is what this Article aims to do. Although administrative law might at first blush appear to be an uncon14
ventional place to look for ideas about how to reform certiorari, this

10

Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 398.
See, e.g., Amanda L. Tyler, Setting the Supreme Court’s Agenda: Is There a Place for
Certification?, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1310, 1310 (2010) (noting that complaints about
the Court’s certiorari practices “tend to reduce to two general assertions: first, the
Court is taking too few cases; and second, the Court is not taking the ‘right’ cases”);
Richard J. Lazarus, Docket Capture at the High Court, 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 89, 89 (2009),
http://yalelawjournal.org/2010/01/24/lazarus.html (arguing that “the Court’s plenary docket is increasingly captured by an elite group of expert Supreme Court advocates” and suggesting that “[i]t is, accordingly, not the number of cases on the plenary
docket but rather their content that is the real problem”); see also infra notes 101-02
and accompanying text (identifying criticisms of the Court’s shrinking docket).
12
See Paul D. Carrington & Roger C. Cramton, Judicial Independence in Excess: Reviving the Judicial Duty of the Supreme Court, 94 CORNELL L. REV. 587, 591 (2009) (proposing “to assign veteran circuit judges to replace some of the young law clerks and to
empower those judges to independently designate a substantial, fixed number of cases
that the Justices would be obliged to decide each year”). In the 1970s, proposals were
made to create a national court of appeals to take over portions of the Court’s certiorari cases. See FREUND REPORT, supra note 7, at 590 (“We recommend creation of a
National Court of Appeals which would screen all petitions for review now filed in the
Supreme Court, and hear and decide on the merits many cases of conflicts between
circuits.”).
13
For a discussion of the few examples of scholarship that briefly reference or discuss administrative law principles when thinking about the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction, see infra note 98.
14
In contrast to the general lack of scholarship connecting administrative law
principles and certiorari, a few scholars have connected administrative law principles
and judicial decisionmaking on the merits. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA
SHERRY, JUDGMENT CALLS: PRINCIPLES AND POLITICS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 40-42
(2009) (drawing on administrative law principles in arguing that courts must engage in
reasoned decisionmaking on the merits); Michael Abramowicz & Thomas B. Colby,
Notice-and-Comment Judicial Decisionmaking, 76 U. CHI. L. REV. 965, 1002 (2009) (arguing
11
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Article argues that both certiorari and administrative law involve the
same underlying concerns of accountability and reasoned decisionmaking that arise when Congress—a deliberative and democratically
accountable branch—delegates broad discretion to a less accountable
body.
The aim here is not to argue that the nondelegation doctrine,
which limits Congress’s ability to delegate lawmaking power, strictly
governs in the certiorari context—although there are persuasive arguments that the doctrine might apply to certiorari that warrant fur15
ther exploration. Rather, the contention is that, even if the nondelegation doctrine does not control certiorari as a constitutional matter,
the same principles that underlie the doctrine—that important policy
decisions should be made in a transparent, accountable, and principled manner—represent sound policy that the Court and Congress
should take into account in considering reforms to certiorari.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I provides an overview
of certiorari. Part II argues that administrative law’s lessons warrant
consideration in the certiorari context because both certiorari and
administrative law involve broad congressional delegations of policymaking discretion to a less accountable body and hence both raise
similar concerns about accountability, transparency, and reasoned
decisionmaking.
Part III looks at well-developed principles and mechanisms that
operate in the administrative law world to constrain discretion—

that federal courts should subject judicial opinions on the merits to a notice-andcomment system).
15
Arguments that the nondelegation doctrine should apply to certiorari might
not start with Article I, Section 1 of the U.S. Constitution, which serves as the font of
the traditional nondelegation doctrine. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (“All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States . . . .”). Rather,
one might start with Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution, which provides that
the Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over specified cases “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” Id. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). In light of this text, the Framers seem to have quite expressly chosen to
give Congress rather than the Court the power to make “exceptions” to the Court’s jurisdiction and to promulgate “regulations” governing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction. Hence, it might be argued that Congress—by delegating docket-setting powers to
the Court without providing a constraining standard—has violated nondelegation
principles. Cf. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 127 (1962) (noting that “Congress has granted the jurisdiction” but that “[i]t is the Supreme Court that makes the exceptions, and it does
so by the case, not by the category; and that is what happens, even though the exceptions are the cases that are heard rather than those that are dismissed”). This Article,
however, does not resolve this constitutional question.

WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

Constraining Certiorari

11/17/2011 11:46 AM

7

namely, the nondelegation doctrine, political oversight, public participation, judicial review, and reason-giving requirements. Part III concludes that the Court’s discretion in the certiorari context is not
checked by similar principles. When Congress gave the Court the
power to pick its cases, for example, Congress did not include any
guiding statutory principle, such as a directive that the Court grant
certiorari where doing so would serve the “public interest,” as the
16
nondelegation doctrine would require in the administrative context.
Nor are the Court’s certiorari decisions constrained by any of the other mechanisms that play a constraining role in administrative law,
such as reason-giving requirements, judicial review, or meaningful political oversight.
Finally, Part IV borrows from administrative law’s lessons and considers three possible means of certiorari reform aimed at increasing
accountability, transparency, and participation: (1) legislating more
meaningful standards to provide an intelligible principle to guide certiorari; (2) providing reasons for certiorari denials or, at a minimum,
disclosing Justices’ votes on certiorari petitions; and (3) increasing the
opportunity for public participation in the certiorari process. Part IV
concludes that a vote-disclosure requirement and increased opportunities for public participation, which could be achieved through greater
use of invited and uninvited amicus curiae briefs as well as a revival of
certification, offer the most promising means of constraining the
Court’s discretion and enabling greater transparency, deliberation,
and monitoring in the certiorari process.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF CERTIORARI
At its inception, the Court’s jurisdiction was not discretionary. Rather, the Court initially stood as a court of obligatory jurisdiction that
felt it had “no more right to decline the exercise of jurisdiction which
17
is given, than to usurp that which is not given.” It was only through
the passage of various laws beginning in 1891 that Congress, responding primarily to functional concerns about the Court’s workload,
transformed the Court from a court with “an entirely mandatory
18
docket” to a court with an “overwhelmingly discretionary one.” This
Part describes that transformation.
16

See infra notes 134 -40 and accompanying text.
Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
18
Jeremy Buchman, Judicial Lobbying and the Politics of Judicial Structure: An Examination of the Judiciary Act of 1925, 24 JUST. SYS. J. 1, 2 (2003); see also RICHARD H. FAL17
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A. The Court’s Beginnings as a Court of Mandatory Jurisdiction
Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution provides for “one supreme Court” and empowers Congress to create inferior federal
19
courts. Article III, Section 2 then defines the judicial power, explaining that the Court shall have “original Jurisdiction” in all cases “affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in
20
which a State shall be Party.” Article III, Section 2 further provides
that the Court shall have “appellate Jurisdiction” in all other “Cases”
and “Controversies” mentioned in Article III, “with such Exceptions,
21
and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.” Hence, as the
leading Supreme Court treatise has put it, the constitutional description of appellate jurisdiction makes clear that “it is Congress, not the
Constitution or the Supreme Court, that defines the precise metes
and bounds of the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over the specified
22
‘cases and controversies.’”
When Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, it created two
types of inferior federal courts: thirteen district courts, as well as three
multidistrict circuit courts that consisted of two Supreme Court Justic23
es and a district judge from within the circuit. Both the district and
the circuit courts generally operated as trial courts in the first instance, with the circuit courts enjoying only a very “limited appellate
24
jurisdiction over the district courts.”

LON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
30 (6th ed. 2009) (noting that the “principle of discretionary review” was introduced
by the Evarts Act (citing Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790 (codified as amended
at 28 U.S.C. § 1257 (2006)))).
19
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
20
Id. § 2.
21
Id. (emphasis added).
22
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 72-73; see also DORIS MARIE PROVINE, CASE SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 9-10 (1980) (“Under the Constitution, Congress has the responsibility to determine the appellate jurisdiction of the
United States Supreme Court.”).
23
See Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, §§ 2–4, 1 Stat. 73, 73-75 (creating the thirteen
district courts and the Eastern, Middle, and Southern circuits); see also FELIX FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 11 (Transaction
Publishers 2007) (1928) (describing the Judiciary Act of 1789).
24
Peter Linzer, The Meaning of Certiorari Denials, 79 COLUM. L. REV. 1227, 1230
(1979); see also Judiciary Act of 1789, §§ 21–22, 1 Stat. at 83-84 (providing appellate jurisdiction to the circuit courts in limited circumstances); FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra
note 23, at 12-13 (noting that the volume of appellate business does not appear to have
been very considerable).
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Congress initially gave the Supreme Court appellate jurisdiction
25
over certain classes of cases coming up from the lower federal courts
26
and the state courts.
These appeals were appeals as of right—
meaning that the Court was obligated to hear the appeal when the
case fell within the Court’s congressionally defined appellate jurisdic27
tion. The Court “had no power to pick and choose which cases to
28
decide.”
The Judiciary Act of 1789 did empower the federal courts to issue
29
various common law writs, including the writ of certiorari, which has
30
its roots as an English prerogative writ. However, the Judiciary Act
did not authorize the Court to use the writ as a means of enabling dis31
cretionary jurisdiction. Rather, the Judiciary Act enabled the Court
to use the writ of certiorari as “an auxiliary process only, to supply im32
perfections in the record of a case already before it.” Accordingly,
during the first one hundred years of its existence, “the Court was ob25

See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 13, 1 Stat. at 80-81 (providing for “appellate jurisdiction from the circuit courts and courts of the several states, in the cases herein after
specifically provided for”); id. § 22, 1 Stat. at 84 -85 (delineating the Court’s appellate
jurisdiction over the district courts).
26
See id. § 25, 1 Stat. at 85-87 (limiting the Court’s appellate jurisdiction over state
court cases to those involving state constitutions in which the validity of those laws is
questioned as being “repugnant” to federal laws); see also Linzer, supra note 24, at 1231
(“[A] litigant had a right to Supreme Court review of most federal noncriminal litigation and of a more limited number of state court decisions.”).
27
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1649 (noting that “the Supreme Court was required to decide those cases within its congressionally-defined jurisdiction”).
28
Id.
29
See Judiciary Act of 1789, § 14, 1 Stat. at 81-82 (enabling federal courts to issue
all writs “necessary for the exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to
the principles and usages of law”).
30
See generally Frank J. Goodnow, The Writ of Certiorari, 6 POL. SCI. Q. 493, 493
(1891) (describing how the writ of certiorari, like most of the English writs, “was originally a prerogative writ”); Harold Weintraub, English Origins of Judicial Review by Prerogative Writ: Certiorari and Mandamus, 9 N.Y. L.F. 478, 504 (1963) (noting that the early
writ of certiorari “was technical nomenclature denoting that certain records or documents were certified and transmitted at the request of the Crown” and explaining that
“[i]n the late Tudor period, certiorari still retained its narrow, mechanical function
and was widely used in criminal proceedings, to bring up records on appeal and to secure certification of official acts”).
31
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650 (“Such certiorari did not provide the Supreme Court with discretionary control over its jurisdiction.”).
32
Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry. Co., 148 U.S. 372, 380
(1893); see also United States v. Dickinson, 213 U.S. 92, 102 (1909) (explaining that the
writ was used more frequently in England than in the United States); In re Chetwood,
165 U.S. 443, 461-62 (1897) (recognizing the limitations in American Construction, but
also noting that the writ may be used “to correct excesses of jurisdiction and in furtherance of justice”); Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650 (describing the history of the writ).
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liged to decide every case that properly came before it, whether by way
33
of an appeal or a writ of error.”
B. From Obligatory to Discretionary Jurisdiction
As the country grew in scale and complexity in the wake of the
34
35
Civil War, the Court’s docket grew “dramatically,” increasing from
253 cases pending in 1850 to 1,816 cases pending at the beginning of
36
the 1890 October Term. Although the Court was obligated to hear
this expanding docket of cases, the reality was that it simply could not
keep up with its mushrooming docket, leading to a “growing backlog
37
of delayed cases.” By 1890, the Court’s docket was so congested that
“it took three and a half years between the time a case was first docketed in the Supreme Court and the time it was orally argued before
38
the justices.”
Congress initially responded to the Court’s workload problems
39
through various “piecemeal and dilatory” solutions, such as by reduc40
ing the Justices’ circuit-riding duties and restricting the Court’s ap41
pellate jurisdiction.
However, in 1891, Congress took a stronger
step: it created nine intermediate federal appellate courts via the
42
Evarts Act. It was in the Evarts Act that Congress first introduced the
statutory writ of certiorari as a mechanism to enable discretionary re-

33

GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 74; see also Buchman, supra note 18, at 2.
See FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 56 - 59 (describing how the postCivil War period “brought with it an accelerated industrial development” and other
political, social and economic forces that led to an increase in the business of the federal courts).
35
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 28
(“Growth in the Supreme Court’s caseload resulted both from an increased population
and from congressional additions to the Court’s jurisdiction, including civil rights, habeas corpus, and patent and copyright cases.” (footnotes omitted)).
36
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 60.
37
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650.
38
WILLIAM H. REHNQUIST, THE SUPREME COURT 236 (2001).
39
PROVINE, supra note 22, at 10.
40
See Act of Apr. 10, 1869, ch. 22, §§ 2–4, 16 Stat. 44, 44-45 (laying out the responsibilities of a circuit judge); see also FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 30 (noting that the 1869 Act “drastically curtailed circuit riding”).
41
See Act of Feb. 16, 1875, ch. 77, § 3, 18 Stat. 315, 316 (raising the jurisdictional
amount in controversy to $5000).
42
The Evarts Act is also known as the Circuit Court of Appeals Act. See Act of Mar.
3, 1891, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826, 826 (creating a court of appeals in each circuit and
requiring the appointment of three circuit judges to each court).
34
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43

view and docket control —planting the early seeds for what was later
44
to become the Court’s almost entirely discretionary docket.
In the Evarts Act, Congress generally continued the longstanding
45
notion of appeals as of right and obligatory jurisdiction. For example, cases from the district courts or existing circuit courts that involved the construction or application of the U.S. Constitution were
still appealable as of right, as were cases involving the conviction of a
46
“capital or otherwise infamous crime.”
Congress, however, also
made circuit court of appeals decisions “final” in certain limited
classes of cases, such as in diversity litigation and in suits under the
47
revenue and patent laws. Congress enabled Supreme Court review of
these limited classes of “final” decisions only if: (1) the court of appeals certified any questions or propositions of law from the case to
the Court; or (2) the Supreme Court granted a writ of certiorari to
48
bring the judgment before it for review. In this way, Congress “began to invest the Court with a bit of discretion in deciding which cases
49
should be given plenary consideration.”
As Hartnett has described, “certiorari was envisioned as a sort of
fallback provision should the circuit courts of appeals prove, on occasion, to be surprisingly careless in deciding cases or issuing certifi50
cates.” The Court’s early use of certiorari confirms this vision of a

43

See id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (allowing the Supreme Court, by certiorari, to review
any cases final in the courts of appeals).
44
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 30 (noting that it was through the innovation of the Evarts Act that “the then revolutionary, but now familiar, principle of discretionary review of federal judgments on writ of certiorari” was born); REYNOLDS ROBERTSON & FRANCIS R. KIRKHAM, JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED
STATES § 310, at 589 (Richard F. Wolfson & Philip B. Kurland eds., Matthew Bender &
Co. 1951) (1936) (“The use of certiorari as an ordinary appellate process had its inception in section 6 of the Circuit Court of Appeals Act of March 3, 1891.” (citing ch. 517,
26 Stat. 826, 828)); see also LAWRENCE BAUM, AMERICAN COURTS: PROCESS AND POLICY
264 (1986) (“The discretionary jurisdiction of some appellate courts over most types of
cases is linked to the creation of appellate systems with two levels.”).
45
See Act of Mar. 3, 1891, §§ 5–6, 26 Stat. at 827-28; FALLON ET AL., supra note 18,
at 30 (“[T]he Act continued to permit Supreme Court review as of right in important
classes of cases, subject in general to a jurisdictional amount requirement of $1,000.”).
46
Act of Mar. 3, 1891, § 5, 26 Stat. at 827-28.
47
See id. § 6, 26 Stat. at 828 (making decisions “final” in some criminal and admiralty cases as well).
48
Id.; see also Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650-51 (drawing from legislative history to
conclude that the use of certiorari seemed to be “distinctly secondary”).
49
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 75.
50
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1656; see also Linzer, supra note 24, at 1234 -36 (describing how Congress intended certiorari to be used sparingly as a “safety valve”).
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very circumscribed role for certiorari: just two years after the enact51
ment of the Evarts Act, certiorari had been granted only two times.
However, as time went by and the Court’s docket continued to
grow, Congress included certiorari in additional jurisdictional acts.
Notably, for example, in 1914, Congress responded to concerns about
the state courts invalidating federal legislation by enabling the Court
to use the discretionary writ of certiorari to review state court judg52
ments upholding federal rights. In expanding the Court’s jurisdiction
to cover cases upholding a federal right, Congress chose to use the discretionary writ of certiorari rather than a mandatory writ to “protect[]
53
the already over-loaded Court from further obligatory jurisdiction.”
In 1916, Congress passed the Webb Act, which again further em54
powered the Court to use certiorari. The Act required that only certiorari be used to review certain state court judgments, including
judgments denying and upholding certain federal rights, and it thereby eliminated the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction over certain cases
55
that had been obligatory since 1789. As various scholars have noted,
the precise reason that Congress chose to expand certiorari in this way
and to leave “a major area of undisputed national importance” to the
56
Court’s discretion is a bit unclear. Indeed, the important certiorari
innovation found in “the Act went through Congress without serious
57
consideration, certainly without debate.” Perhaps this was because
Congress was focused on the Act’s main aim of saving the Court from
58
voluminous employers’ liability litigation, or perhaps it was because
51

See Cunard S.S. Co. v. Fabre, 13 S. Ct. 1045, 1045 (1892) (granting certiorari
without further opinion); Lau Ow Bew’s Case, 141 U.S. 583, 589 (1891) (granting certiorari but advising that “this branch of our jurisdiction should be exercised sparingly
and with great caution”); see also Am. Constr. Co. v. Jacksonville, Tampa & Key W. Ry.
Co., 148 U.S. 372, 383-84 (1893) (noting that Lau Ow Bew’s Case and Cunard Steamship
were the only two cases in which the Court had granted certiorari).
52
Act of Dec. 23, 1914, ch. 2, 38 Stat. 790; see also FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at
30 (attributing the expansion to Congress’s “hostility to state court decisions invalidating legislation under the Due Process Clause”); Linzer, supra note 24, at 1237-38 (explaining that Congress was seeking “a safety valve for anomalous cases”).
53
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 196.
54
Act of Sept. 6, 1916, Pub. L. No. 64 -258, § 2, 39 Stat. 726, 726 - 27.
55
See id.; see also Linzer, supra note 24, at 1239-40 (explaining that after the 1916
Webb Act, there was no longer an automatic right to review of federal claims in the
Supreme Court unless “a treaty, statute or ‘authority’” was involved).
56
Linzer, supra note 24, at 1239-40; cf. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at
213; Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1658.
57
FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 23, at 213 (noting that Congress passed the
legislation “as though it were a perfunctory measure”).
58
Id.
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the measure was authored by Justice James Clark McReynolds, who
was familiar with members of the House and Senate Judiciary Com59
mittees due to his prior service as Attorney General. Regardless, the
Act played an important role in certiorari’s transformation.
Next came the most significant congressional expansion of certiorari: the passage of the Judges’ Bill of 1925 (also called the Judiciary
60
The bill—called the Judges’ Bill because the Justices themAct).
selves drafted the legislation and Chief Justice William Howard Taft
61
lobbied for the bill —withdrew “all but a few categories of cases” from
the Court’s mandatory docket and effectively “gave to the Court pow62
er to control its docket.” In lobbying for the bill, the Justices argued
that their workload had become unmanageable and that they were
forced to spend their time deciding cases that failed to raise important
63
issues. In this sense, both the Justices lobbying for the bill and the
legislators who passed the bill seemed to understand that the need to
delegate agenda-setting discretion to the Court flowed from functional concerns about the Court’s capacities and workload.
Even the dramatic expansion of certiorari brought about by the
Judges’ Bill, however, did not ultimately prove sufficient to deal with
64
the Court’s workload issues. The Court’s docket continued to grow,
fueled by the growth of the economy and the administrative state and
65
also by the Court’s recognition of new constitutional rights. Various
proposals for alleviating the Court’s unmanageable workload began to
surface, including a well-known study published in 1972 called the
59

Id. at 213-14.
Judiciary Act of 1925, Pub. L. No. 68-415, 43 Stat. 936.
61
Linzer, supra note 24, at 1240-41.
62
Dick v. N.Y. Life Ins. Co., 359 U.S. 437, 459 (1959) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
63
See, e.g., Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 Before a Subcomm. of the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 45 (1924) (statement of Justice James C. McReynolds) (“It will not be possible to keep up with the docket unless some way is found to
relieve the court of relatively unimportant things.”); id. at 26 - 27 (statement of Justice
Willis Van Devanter) (noting that many cases are unnecessarily heard by the Court due
to its obligatory jurisdiction).
64
See Tara Leigh Grove, The Structural Case for Vertical Maximalism, 95 CORNELL L.
REV. 1, 50-51 (2009) (identifying reasons for the growth of the Supreme Court’s docket in the latter half of the twentieth century).
65
See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court,
100 HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1402 (1987) (“The pattern has been clear: as the nation’s
population and economy have grown and as legal assistance has become more widely
available, the number of cases filed in federal courts, the number of federal judges,
and the Supreme Court’s docket have grown concurrently.”); Grove, supra note 64, at
50-51 (noting that “the expanding federal administrative state and . . . changes in the
Court’s own doctrine” were partly responsible for the increasing volume).
60
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Freund Report, which recommended the “creation of a National
Court of Appeals which would screen all petitions for review [then]
filed in the Supreme Court, and hear and decide on the merits many
66
cases of conflicts between circuits.” The Freund Report did not suc67
ceed, but in 1988 Congress passed legislation that eliminated “vir68
tually all of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction.” As a result, today
only a very small number of cases fall within the Court’s mandatory
69
These cases arise out of statutes in which
appellate jurisdiction.
Congress has called for mandatory review of the decisions of three70
judge district court panels, such as decisions in voting rights cases.
Otherwise, the Court today enjoys unfettered discretion to set its ap71
pellate docket.
C. Current Certiorari Practices
In recent years, the Court has received around 8000 or 9000 certi72
orari petitions per year, but the Court has granted only about one
73
percent of all petitions. This extreme selectivity means that, in many

66

FREUND REPORT, supra note 7, at 590.
Supreme Court Case Selections Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-352, 102 Stat. 662.
68
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 75-76 & n.11 (explaining which statutory
provisions providing mandatory jurisdiction were repealed by the 1988 legislation).
69
Id. at 75-76.
70
See 42 U.S.C. § 1973c(a) (2006) (providing that claims of unconstitutional voter
disenfranchisement are to be raised to a three-judge district court panel and appealed
directly to the Supreme Court); see also 28 U.S.C. § 1253 (2006) (permitting appeal to
the Supreme Court for an order granting or denying an interlocutory or permanent
injunction in a civil action before a three-judge district court panel).
71
See Buchman, supra note 18, at 2 (asserting that the Court has shifted from an
entirely mandatory to an “overwhelmingly discretionary” docket); see also FALLON ET
AL., supra note 18, at 30 (noting that since the Judges’ Bill of 1925, “the principle of
review at the Court’s discretion has become ever more dominant until, today, mandatory appellate jurisdiction has entirely disappeared in cases originating in state courts
and has virtually disappeared in federal cases”).
72
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 312 (noting that “the Justices consider and
dispose of over eight thousand certiorari petitions each term”); see also, e.g., The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, 124 HARV. L. REV. 411, 418 (2010) (showing 9296
total cases on the Court’s paid and in forma pauperis appellate docket during the 2009
Term).
73
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 321 (“During the nine terms from 1992 to
2002, the Court granted 1.19 percent of the certiorari petitions filed.”); The Supreme
Court, 2009 Term—The Statistics, supra note 72, at 418 (noting that the Court granted
review in 77 out of 8131 total cases, or 0.9%, on its appellate docket in 2009).
67
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74

ways, the process of “deciding to decide” is just as important as the
75
Court’s decisions on the merits of cases, if not even more important.
The Court’s process for reviewing certiorari petitions is fairly sim76
ple. Currently, all of the Justices except Justice Alito participate in
what is called the “cert pool,” whereby the Justices aggregate their law
clerks and assign one law clerk from the group to each certiorari peti77
tion. Once a petition for certiorari is filed and circulated to the Justices’ chambers, the pool clerk assigned to that petition will review the
petition and write a memo, recommending that the Court either
78
grant or deny the petition or take some other action.
After the pool memo is circulated within the Court, the Justices
who participate in the pool review the memo, and occasionally the
certiorari papers, before deciding whether a particular certiorari peti79
tion should be placed on the “discuss list.” The discuss list serves as
74

This phrase is taken from Deciding to Decide, H.W. Perry’s famous book. H.W.
PERRY, JR., DECIDING TO DECIDE: AGENDA SETTING IN THE UNITED STATES SUPREME
COURT (1991).
75
See, e.g., Margaret Meriwether Cordray & Richard Cordray, Setting the Social
Agenda: Deciding to Review High-Profile Cases at the Supreme Court, 57 U. KAN. L. REV. 313,
314-15 (2009) (arguing that the Court’s certiorari decisions set the national political
and cultural agenda and determine the Court’s “institutional and moral authority”); see
also sources cited supra note 7.
76
Adam Liptak, A Second Justice Opts Out of a Longtime Custom: The ‘Cert. Pool,’ N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2008, at A21 (noting that Justice Alito, like Justice Stevens before him,
has opted out of the “cert. pool” and comparing the advantages and disadvantages of
participation).
77
See Carrington & Cramton, supra note 12, at 631 (explaining the history and
functions of the cert pool and describing how law clerks writing memos for the pool
“strive objectively to discern the reasons why petitions should be denied”).
78
See Carolyn Shapiro, The Law Clerk Proxy Wars: Secrecy, Accountability, and Ideology
in the Supreme Court, 37 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 101, 110 (2009) (describing the creation of
the cert pool in 1972 and its functions); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 233
(2001) (describing law clerks’ memo-writing duties and Justice Rehnquist’s reliance on
those memos); Andrew F. Hessick & Samuel P. Jordan, Setting the Size of the Supreme
Court, 41 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 645, 703-04 (2009) (“The [cert] pool thus seeks both to avoid
unnecessary redundancy—each Justice and his clerks independently summarizing the
facts and legal issues of a case—by dividing that work among the various clerks, and to
preserve the important redundancy of each Justice independently voting whether to
grant review.”). Other actions that might be recommended by a pool clerk include
calling for the views of the Solicitor General or requesting a response from the respondent. See David R. Stras, The Supreme Court’s Gatekeepers: The Role of Law Clerks in the
Certiorari Process, 85 TEX. L. REV. 947, 991 (2007) (book review) (cataloguing cert pool
recommendations in certain years from 1984 through 1992, which include actions
other than simply granting or denying certiorari).
79
Cf. REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 233-34 (noting that with a “large majority of
the petitions,” he reviewed only cert pool memos, which would have been annotated
by one of his own law clerks).
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an internal court document—it is not circulated to the public or the
parties—that lists those certiorari petitions that have been selected for
80
discussion at conference by at least one Justice. Any one Justice has
the power to place a certiorari petition on the discuss list simply by
81
asking. Certiorari petitions not placed on the list are automatically
denied without conference discussion, whereas those certiorari peti82
tions that are placed on the discuss list are discussed and voted on.
Justice Ginsburg has estimated that eighty-five percent of petitions are
denied without discussion, meaning that only about fifteen percent
83
are placed on the discuss list.
If a certiorari petition does make the discuss list, then the Justices
84
discuss and vote on the petition at conference. These private conferences are held behind closed doors with only the Justices in atten85
dance; no law clerks or aides may attend. Under the “Rule of Four,”
a certiorari petition will be granted if at least four Justices vote to
86
grant at conference. If there are fewer than four votes, certiorari is
87
denied.
When a certiorari petition is either granted or denied, the Court
does not routinely disclose the Justices’ votes, nor does the Court ex80

See generally Gregory A. Caldeira & John R. Wright, The Discuss List: Agenda
Building in the Supreme Court, 24 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 807, 808 (1990) (examining the
“composition, sources, and implications” of the discuss list); see also GRESSMAN ET AL.,
supra note 3, at 320 (noting that “the [discuss] list is never made public” and that “it is
futile to inquire whether a particular case did or did not make the discuss list”); John
Paul Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 13 (1983) (noting
the historical evolution from the use of a “dead list,” on which only those petitions that
would be automatically denied were listed, to a “discuss list”).
81
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 319.
82
See id. (“[C]ases that do not appear on the list by the day before the conference
are automatically denied without even being mentioned at conference.”); see also
BAUM, supra note 44, at 264 (“Petitions for certiorari that fail to reach [the discuss] list
are denied without collective consideration.”).
83
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Thomas Jefferson Lecture: Workways of the Supreme
Court (Feb. 6, 2003), in 25 T. JEFFERSON L. REV. 517, 519-20 (2003); see also REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 234 (remarking that if “there are one hundred petitions for
certiorari on the conference list, the number discussed at conference will range from
fifteen to thirty”).
84
GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 322-23.
85
Id.; see also REHNQUIST, supra note 38, at 224 (“The conference[] . . . [is] attended only by the justices themselves; they are not open to the public or to other
Court personnel.”).
86
See generally Stevens, supra note 80, at 10 (discussing the origins of the so-called
“Rule of Four”).
87
Id.; see also GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 324 (“Four votes are still required
for a grant of certiorari.”).
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plain its reasons for granting or denying certiorari. Occasionally, Justices who disagree with the Court’s disposition of a certiorari petition
88
will publish an opinion dissenting from the denial of certiorari, or
will ask that their votes be noted in the Court’s order respecting certi89
orari. In addition, sometimes the Court will include a cursory explanation of its decision to grant certiorari when the Court ultimately
90
issues its opinion on the merits in the case. But in most cases, no
explanation “is ever rendered for the Court’s action,” and “no record
of the Court’s vote is ever published (regardless of whether the case is
91
granted or denied).”
Hence, as Carolyn Shapiro has noted, the
Court exercises its discretion via a process that operates very much
92
like a “black box” that is “shroud[ed] in intense secrecy.”
Indeed, the only real insight the Court gives the public about the
factors that motivate its certiorari decisions can be found in Supreme
93
Court Rule 10. However, Rule 10 merely provides a list of considerations that the Court might, in its discretion, take into account when
deciding whether to grant certiorari. Specifically, Rule 10 stresses that
“[r]eview on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial
discretion,” and that the writ will be granted “only for compelling rea94
sons.” Rule 10 does list the importance of the question presented
88

See, e.g., Alderman v. United States, 131 S. Ct. 700, 702 (2011) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“It is difficult to imagine a better case for certiorari.”);
Nurre v. Whitehead, 130 S. Ct. 1937, 1940 (2010) (Alito, J., dissenting from denial of
certiorari) (“A decision with such potentially broad and troubling implications merits
our review.”); see also Singleton v. Comm’r, 439 U.S. 940, 944 -46 (1978) (Stevens, J.,
respecting the denial of certiorari) (discussing the increase in the practice of dissenting from denials of certiorari and whether these dissents serve any purpose); Linzer,
supra note 24, at 1256-59 (describing the growth in the 1970s of the practice of writing
dissents from certiorari denials); Adam Liptak, Sotomayor Guides Court’s Liberal Wing,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 28, 2010 at A10 (noting that just months into the 2010 Term, Justice
Sotomayor had exercised her discretion to write three dissents from certiorari denials).
89
See Linzer, supra note 24, at 1262 (explaining that some Justices will include a
“bare notation[]” of dissent stating simply that “Mr. Justice Q would grant certiorari”);
see also GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 331 (noting that dissents from denials “take
forms ranging from a simple notation of a dissent to an elaborate dissenting opinion”).
90
See, e.g., New Process Steel, L.P. v. NLRB, 130 S. Ct. 2635, 2639 (2010) ( justifying the Court’s decision to grant certiorari in order to resolve a “conflict”); Wyeth v.
Levine, 129 S. Ct. 1187, 1193 (2009) (granting certiorari because of the importance of
the preemption issue at stake and because the relevant agency had changed its opinion); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 9 (2005) (“The obvious importance of the case
prompted our grant of certiorari.”).
91
Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 402.
92
Shapiro, supra note 78 , at 103.
93
SUP. CT. R. 10.
94
Id.
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and the presence of a conflict in the lower courts as factors that the
Court might consider, but notes that these factors do not “control[]
95
nor fully measur[e] the Court’s discretion.” Rule 10, accordingly,
does nothing to diminish the near absolute discretion that Congress
96
has given the Court.
II. THE RELEVANCE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
ANALOGY TO CERTIORARI REFORM
The Court’s unfettered discretion to set its docket via certiorari
has not gone unnoticed. To the contrary, various scholars and Court
watchers have criticized certiorari and proposed reforms. However,
these proposals for reform have focused primarily on forcing the
Court to hear certain kinds of cases or to hear more cases, or alternatively on taking certiorari discretion away from the Court and giving it
to some other body, as will be described in this Part. Largely missing
from the dialogue has been much serious discussion about the source
of the Court’s discretion (namely, various delegations from Congress)
and how the broad discretion Congress has given to the Court might
97
be constrained while leaving it with the Court. In particular, scholars have failed to look to another area of the law that already has
thought long and hard about how to constrain delegated discretion:
98
administrative law.
Because administrative law is concerned with
95

Id.
For a further discussion of Rule 10, see infra subsection III.A.3.
97
One notable exception should be mentioned: Hartnett has written a detailed
article on certiorari that does focus on the source of the Court’s discretion, describing
in detail Congress’s various legislative acts granting discretion to the Court. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1650-57, 1713-30 (tracing the development of certiorari and also
raising questions about certiorari practice). However, Hartnett did not propose specific means of cabining the Court’s discretion. His aim was to suggest that certiorari be
questioned, not to propose specific solutions. Id. at 1647.
98
I am aware of only three works that briefly discuss administrative law principles
in connection with certiorari. The most relevant is a recent essay by Richard Lazarus
that argues that the Court’s plenary docket “is increasingly captured by an elite group
of expert Supreme Court advocates, dominated by those in the private bar,” and suggests that the problem of docket capture might be solved by analogy to “the kinds of
structural reforms that have been made in administrative agencies to reduce the risk of
agency capture.” Lazarus, supra note 11, at 89, 96. The other two works are less on
point, raising administrative law only in a fairly general sense. One of these works is a
piece by Samuel Estreicher and John Sexton, which suggests that when the Court
makes certiorari decisions, the Court operates in an administrative fashion by managing our judicial system. Samuel Estreicher & John E. Sexton, A Managerial Theory of the
Supreme Court’s Responsibilities, 59 N.Y.U. L. REV. 681, 812 (1984). Estreicher and Sexton make one very direct analogy to administrative law, suggesting that perhaps the
Court could take a cue from administrative law principles and disseminate its certiorari
96
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controlling delegations to agencies and preventing arbitrary agency
99
decisionmaking, it stands as an untapped resource for suggesting potential certiorari reforms.
A. Criticisms of Certiorari and Proposals for Reform
100

Complaints about certiorari are commonplace today. Many critics have focused on the Court’s shrinking docket, arguing that the
101
Court should be hearing many more cases than it does. As Kenneth
Starr has pointed out, “the Supreme Court’s docket has shrunk from
146 signed opinions during Chief Justice Rehnquist’s first year occupying the Court’s center seat to just 74 signed opinions during his fi102
nal year.”
In addition, some critics have focused on the type of cases the
Court accepts, arguing that the Court is taking the wrong mix of cases.
Senator Arlen Specter, for example, has complained that the Court is
103
not taking enough “high-profile major constitutional cases,” while
Starr has asserted that the Court should take more cases that are less
104
“headline-grabbing” in nature.
Some have argued that the Court is
standards for public comment. Id. at 800. I am aware of only one other work that
mentions administrative law principles in the certiorari context: Hartnett’s piece on
the Judges’ Bill briefly summarizes Estreicher and Sexton’s work and notes that they
seem to view certiorari as an exercise of managerial or administrative power. See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1726-30.
99
See 3 RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 17.1, at 1231 (4th
ed. 2002) (“Much of administrative law is a response to the existence of broad discretionary power in government officials.”); see also id. at 1227-28 (noting that “[m]any
administrative law doctrines are a response” to the well-known problem that “conferring too much discretion on an individual or institution creates the potential for harm
attributable to abuse of discretion”).
100
See, e.g., Tyler, supra note 11, at 1313-17 (noting several frequent complaints
about the Supreme Court’s current certiorari practices). But see J. Harvie Wilkinson III, If
It Ain’t Broke . . . , 119 YALE L.J. ONLINE 67, 68-72 (2010), http://yalelawjournal.org/
2010/01/07/wilkinson.html (defending the status quo in the certiorari context).
101
See Margaret Cordray & Richard Cordray, Numbers That Don’t Befit the Court,
WASH. POST, July 11, 2006, at A17 (“During the term just concluded, the court issued a
grand total of 71 plenary decisions (in cases with full argument)—its lowest output
since the Civil War.”); Philip Allen Lacovara, The Incredible Shrinking Court, AM. LAW.,
Dec. 2003, at 53, 53 (noting that “[i]f their productivity were measured by private sector standards, the Supremes might receive pink slips”); Adam Liptak, Justices Opt for
Fewer Cases, and Professors and Lawyers Ponder Why, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2009, at A18
(discussing possible reasons for the Court’s shrinking docket).
102
Kenneth W. Starr, The Supreme Court and Its Shrinking Docket: The Ghost of William Howard Taft, 90 MINN. L. REV. 1363, 1368 (2006).
103
Arlen Specter, The Chamber of Secrets, NAT’L L.J., Aug. 3, 2009, at 38.
104
Starr, supra note 102, at 1366.
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not taking enough cases implicating circuit splits or disagreement in
105
the courts below, or that the Court is not granting enough cases in
106
areas of the law that are governed by standards rather than rules. In
addition, Richard Lazarus has argued that the Court has been granting
too many certiorari petitions filed by expert Supreme Court litigators
107
who represent “the more powerful economic interests.”
A few critics also seem concerned with the process the Court uses
to make its certiorari decisions. It is here that the cert pool and the
role of law clerks have come under attack. Starr, for example, has argued that the cert pool has become “too powerful,” giving clerks “an
108
unjustifiable influence over which cases the Supreme Court reviews.”
Others have speculated that the Court’s shrinking docket may—at
least in part—be due to law clerks’ reluctance to stick out their necks
109
and recommend grants in pool memos.
In order to address some of the perceived problems with the
Court’s current certiorari practices, numerous proposals for reform
have been floated in the past few years alone. For example, Starr recently suggested one idea for reform: the Court should “put its
110
shoulder to the wheel and work harder” by hearing more cases. In
addition, Paul Carrington and Roger Cramton recently proposed the
creation of a Certiorari Division that would consist of thirteen Article
III judges who would be tasked with “selecting perhaps as many as 120
111
cases a term that the Court would be obliged to decide.”
Subse105

See, e.g., id. at 1365 (asserting that “the Supreme Court by and large does not
even pretend to maintain the uniformity of federal law”).
106
See, e.g., Carolyn Shapiro, The Limits of the Olympian Court: Common Law Judging
Versus Error Correction in the Supreme Court, 63 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 271, 287-90 (2006)
(decrying the Court for failing to distinguish between rules and standards in certiorari
decisions).
107
Lazarus, supra note 11, at 89.
108
Starr, supra note 102, at 1366, 1376-77; see also Carrington & Cramton, supra
note 12, at 632 (proposing to replace the cert pool “with a panel of experienced federal judges”); Shapiro, supra note 106, at 286 (arguing that “[t]he Court’s reliance on the
cert pool . . . increases the likelihood that chaotic areas of the law may be given short
shrift, due to the law clerks’ and Justices’ unfamiliarity with more mundane areas of
the law”).
109
See Stras, supra note 78, at 968-72 (describing different views on the relationship
between the cert pool and the decline of the Court’s plenary docket and concluding
that the cert pool might be contributing to the decline).
110
Starr, supra note 102, at 1383, 1385.
111
Carrington & Cramton, supra note 12, at 632. This proposal was converted into
draft legislation, garnered the signatures of nineteen proponents, predominantly law
professors, and in 2009 was submitted to the House and Senate Judiciary Committees.
See Four Proposals for a Judiciary Act, PAUL DEWITT CARRINGTON (Feb. 9, 2009),
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quently, Sanford Levinson, using the Carrington and Cramton proposal as a point of departure, suggested that the Certiorari Division
might consist not only of federal judges, but also of state judges and
112
public representatives.
B. Administrative Law as an Untapped Resource for Reform
Despite all of the ink that scholars and Court watchers have spilled
criticizing the Court’s certiorari discretion and proposing reforms,
scholars studying certiorari generally have failed to look to administrative law, an area whose central goal is constraining delegated discretion.
Perhaps the failure to look to the lessons of administrative law
when considering certiorari reform is understandable. After all, at
first blush, administrative law and the Supreme Court’s certiorari practice might not appear to share much in common. The Court’s certiorari power involves questions about which cases the U.S. Supreme
Court will hear, whereas administrative law involves questions surrounding agency action and inaction, such as decisions made by the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) about whether and how to
113
regulate emissions that lead to global warming.
In addition, certiorari decisions are made by nine Justices who enjoy lifetime tenure
and salary protections, whereas administrative law concerns itself with
decisions made by officials who are much more accountable. Furthermore, although Congress could use the powers vested in it by Arhttp://paulcarrington.com/Four%20Proposals%20for%20a%20Judiciary%20Act.htm
(laying out this and three other suggested reforms).
112
See Levinson, supra note 8, at 111 (suggesting that, on the subject of public representatives, “[i]f there really is a point to the Supreme Court’s doing anything beyond
providing uniform ‘solutions’ to conflicts below, then ordinary citizens should be able
to offer their own valuable perspectives as to when intervention is needed (and when it
is just fine to leave well enough alone)”). Although Levinson does not explore potential constitutional hurdles that might stand in the way of his proposal, a few immediately come to mind. For example, if the certiorari power is an exercise of legislative power, then Levinson’s proposal to delegate the certiorari process to nongovernmental
actors might raise serious constitutional issues. See, e.g., Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298
U.S. 238, 310-12 (1936) (holding unconstitutional the delegation of the power to set
maximum hour and minimum wage provisions to coal industry executives); 1 PIERCE,
supra note 99, § 2.6, at 93 (describing how the “Court continues to impose meaningful
limits on congressional delegation of regulatory power to private parties”). Alternatively, if the certiorari power is an exercise of judicial power, then Levinson’s proposal
might violate the so-called “oneness” principle found in Article III. See U.S. CONST. art.
III, § 1 (vesting the judicial power in “one supreme Court” and in such lower federal
courts as Congress shall create (emphasis added)).
113
See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 514 (2007) (reviewing the EPA’s refusal
to regulate greenhouse gas emissions).
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ticle III, Section 2 of the Constitution to regulate which cases the
114
Court hears, Congress cannot decide the merits of constitutional
cases facing the Court, whereas Congress could decide the merits of
policy matters that it chooses to delegate to agencies.
Despite these differences, administrative law and certiorari share
much more in common than might immediately be apparent. Specifically, both certiorari and administrative law involve Congress delegating broad discretion to other governmental actors, largely for functional reasons relating to expertise and flexibility. These delegations
of policymaking power, in turn, raise concerns that principles of accountability, transparency, and rationality might be subverted.
Beginning with the world of administrative law, Congress routinely hands over broad policymaking powers to agencies—power that
Congress could have chosen to exercise itself. For example, Congress
has given the EPA the authority to regulate new motor vehicle emis115
sions that lead to global warming. Similarly, Congress recently gave
116
These sorts of
the FDA the power to regulate tobacco products.
delegations to agencies arise largely for functional reasons relating to
117
agency expertise, specialization, and flexibility.
Congress, in other
words, chooses to transfer large portions of quasi-legislative power to
various federal agencies largely because “Congress lacks the capacity—
the expertise, the resources, the time, the foresight, the flexibility—to
address every detail that might prove to be relevant to any given legis118
lative scheme.”

114
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that “the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction” over certain types of cases “with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make” (emphasis added)).
115
See Massachusetts, 549 U.S. at 533-34 (holding that the Clean Air Act empowers
the EPA to regulate new motor vehicle greenhouse gas emissions and concluding that
the agency’s reasons for denying a rulemaking petition were arbitrary and capricious).
116
See Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
§ 3, 123 Stat. 1776, 1781 (2009) (codified at 21 U.S.C. § 387 note (2006 & Supp. 2010)).
117
See Cass R. Sunstein, Constitutionalism After the New Deal, 101 HARV. L. REV. 421,
440-41 (1987) (suggesting that the increase in grants of authority to regulatory agencies
during the New Deal was motivated in part by a conception of administrative agencies
“as politically insulated, self-starting, and technically sophisticated”); Alexander Dill,
Comment, Scope of Review of Rulemaking After Chadha: A Case for the Delegation Doctrine?,
33 EMORY L.J. 953, 953 (1984) (“Congress has routinely granted broad discretionary
authority to agencies in order to accord them the flexibility necessary in highly technical areas of regulation such as nuclear energy and environmental health, as well as in
areas of economic regulation such as banking and corporate securities . . . .”).
118
Margaret H. Lemos, The Other Delegate: Judicially Administered Statutes and the
Nondelegation Doctrine, 81 S. CAL. L. REV. 405, 412 (2008).
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Despite the compelling practical reasons for Congress to delegate
to agencies, these delegations have not been without controversy. In
particular, many administrative law scholars have argued that Congress’s decisions to legislate only in very broad strokes and to leave the
details of policymaking up to agencies threaten principles of accountability, transparency, and rationality. For example, Martin Redish has
argued that delegations of policymaking powers to agencies undermine
accountability “by removing basic social policy choices from those who
119
are most representative of and accountable to the electorate.”
Although today we routinely allow broad delegations of power to
administrative agencies, concerns about accountability, transparency,
and rationality have not gone completely unheeded. To the contrary,
administrative law’s primary purpose has been to develop various legal
structures and mechanisms—such as political oversight, judicial review, public participation, and reason-giving requirements—that help
120
to legitimate and control agency action.
Now compare Congress’s delegations in the administrative world
with Congress’s delegation to the Court in the certiorari context. Given that Article III expressly empowers Congress to make exceptions to
121
and regulations governing the Court’s appellate jurisdiction, Congress could have chosen to precisely delineate the cases that the Court
must hear (as it did for the first 100-plus years of the Court’s exis122
tence).
Nonetheless, rather than defining which cases the Court

119

MARTIN H. REDISH, THE CONSTITUTION AS POLITICAL STRUCTURE 142 (1995);
see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 13134 (1980) (discussing the incentives for, and problems raised by, risk-averse legislators
passing off substantive and contentious policy decisions onto “executive-branch bureaucrat[s]” and “independent regulatory comission[s]”). See generally DAVID SCHOENBROD,
POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 99-152, 155-77 (1993) (criticizing Congress’s delegation to administrative agencies and suggesting a revival of the nondelegation doctrine).
120
See generally KEITH WERHAN, PRINCIPLES OF ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 31 (2008)
(“Americans have relied on administrative law to ensure that agencies perform [their]
functions with due regard for the rule of law, a proper respect for individual rights,
and a sense of fidelity to our deepest constitutional commitments.”).
121
See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (providing that “the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction” over certain types of cases “with such Exceptions, and under such
Regulations as the Congress shall make” (emphasis added)).
122
Cf. James F. Blumstein, The Supreme Court’s Jurisdiction—Reform Proposals, Discretionary Review, and Writ Dismissals, 26 VAND. L. REV. 895, 907 (1973) (“The kinds of jurisdictional decisions that Congress normally makes for the federal judiciary as a whole
it delegated to the Justices through passage of the 1925 Act.”); Daniel J. Meador, Reining in the Superlegislature: A Response to Professors Carrington and Cramton, 94 CORNELL L.
REV. 657, 660 (2009) (“Eighteenth- and nineteenth-century jurists would have found
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would hear, Congress chose to delegate policymaking power to the
Court, giving the Court the discretion to decide which cases are important enough to warrant review. The Court is free to decide, for
example, that fact-bound cases involving mere error correction or
cases involving the misapplication of a properly stated rule of law do
123
not warrant review.
Although today we are well accustomed to the
notion that the Court enjoys such broad discretion (just as we are by
now well accustomed to the notion that agencies can and do wield
significant policymaking powers), the Court’s wide discretion in this
area (just like agencies’ broad discretion to set policy) exists as a re124
sult of legislative delegation.
Much like in the administrative law world, Congress’s willingness
to give the Court broad discretion can be explained largely by functional concerns relating to expertise and flexibility. Congressional testimony given by Solicitor General Beck in 1922 prior to the passage of
the Judges’ Bill, for example, helps to highlight the themes of expertise and flexibility that motivated the transfer of power from Congress
to the Court. According to the Solicitor General, “[s]omebody must
determine” which are “the cases of public importance,” and “[t]he
court can do that far better than can any hard and fast law describing
125
what cases shall be heard and what cases shall not be heard.” Similarly, in advocating for the passage of the Judges’ Bill, Chief Justice
Taft drew on notions of expertise: “His essential message to Congress
126
was ‘trust us.’” Presumably, these notions of expertise and flexibility
were not entirely unfamiliar to Congress when it was considering the
the concept [of discretionary appellate jurisdiction] novel and inconsistent with the
role of a court, especially in a separation-of-powers regime.”).
123
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (“A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the
asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly
stated rule of law.”).
124
Some have implied otherwise, suggesting that the Court’s power to set its own
docket is an inherent judicial function. For example, Justice Arthur Goldberg once
stated that “[t]he power to decide cases presupposes the power to determine what cases will be decided.” Retired Chief Justice Warren Attacks, Chief Justice Burger Defends Freund
Study Group’s Composition and Proposal, 59 A.B.A. J. 721, 730 (1973) (statement of Chief
Justice Earl Warren) (quoting Justice Goldberg); see also Brennan, supra note 7, at 484
(agreeing with Justice Goldberg). However, as Meador has aptly explained, a claim
that the Court’s discretion to set its own agenda is “inherent in and inseparable from
the Justices’ jurisdiction to decide cases on their merits” confuses “the familiar with the
necessary.” Meador, supra note 122, at 661.
125
Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearing on
H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 26 (1922) (statement of
James M. Beck, Solicitor General).
126
Starr, supra note 102, at 1364.
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Judges’ Bill, given that the bill was enacted in 1925—roughly around
the same time that Congress was delegating increasingly broad powers
to agencies and was creating significant new agencies, such as the
127
Federal Trade Commission in 1914.
As with delegations to agencies in the administrative world, Congress’s decision to delegate policymaking power to the Court has generated concern that principles of accountability, transparency, and rationality are being evaded. For example, two scholars have noted that
certiorari is “striking,” because unlike judicial evaluation of cases on
the merits, certiorari lacks “collegial deliberation, constraining crite128
ria, majority rule, and public accountability.” Similarly, Harnett has
argued that “[t]he ability to set one’s own agenda is at the heart of exercising will” and that certiorari is difficult to reconcile with “rule of
129
law” principles.
Hence, Congress’s delegation to the Court in the
certiorari context raises many of the same concerns as do Congress’s
delegations to agencies.
III. CHECKS ON CERTIORARI VS. CHECKS ON
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCIES
Even though congressional delegation of docket control to the
Court raises many of the same concerns as does congressional delegation of discretion to administrative agencies, administrative law’s lessons have not been carried over and applied in the certiorari context.
Certiorari does not appear to comport with the so-called nondelegation doctrine. Nor is the Court’s discretion constrained by other softer administrative law mechanisms, including political oversight, public participation, judicial review, and reason-giving requirements. This

127

Cf. WERHAN, supra note 120, at 13-18 (describing the birth of the modern administrative state during the Progressive Era and noting that Progressives believed in
expert-driven decisionmaking by specialists); Thomas W. Merrill & Kathryn Tongue
Watts, Agency Rules with the Force of Law: The Original Convention, 116 HARV. L. REV. 467,
504 -20 (2002) (describing the creation of new agencies and the delegation of power to
agencies in the Progressive and New Deal eras). Increased delegation to the Court via
the Judges’ Bill also occurred less than a decade prior to the passage of the Rules
Enabling Act of 1934, which gave the Supreme Court the power to prescribe general
rules for the district courts. See Rules Enabling Act of 1934, Pub. L. No. 73-415, 48 Stat.
1064 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006)). See generally Stephen B. Burbank, The Rules Enabling Act of 1934, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 1015 (1982) (providing a detailed overview of the Rules Enabling Act).
128
Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 398.
129
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1718, 1722.
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leaves the Court’s broad discretion—unlike agencies’ delegated policymaking discretion—unchecked and unconstrained.
A. The Nondelegation Doctrine
When Congress delegates legislative-like power to administrative
agencies, the so-called “nondelegation doctrine” operates as a check
to constrain these delegations. The nondelegation doctrine is based
on Article I, Section 1 of the Constitution, which provides that “[a]ll
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the
130
United States.”
For close to 200 years, “the Court has interpreted
that provision to prohibit Congress from delegating its legislative
131
Our
power and has equated legislative power with policymaking.”
constitutional commitment to representative democracy provides a
major reason for reading the Constitution this way: by ensuring that
the most democratic branch conducts our lawmaking, principles of
132
political accountability are protected.
Despite generally reading the Constitution to prohibit delegations
of legislative authority, the Court has never erected a very rigid line
between permissible and impermissible delegations. The inquiry currently used by the Court, which was first articulated in 1928 in J.W.
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States, focuses on the presence of an intel133
ligible principle. When Congress sets forth an intelligible principle,
then the entity exercising the delegated power is deemed to be acting
130

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1.
RICHARD J. PIERCE, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 7 (2008). However, in recent
years, some scholars and judges have questioned this view. See, e.g., Whitman v. Am.
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 489 (2001) (Stevens, J., joined by Souter, J., concurring
in part and concurring in the judgment) (noting that the text of Article I’s Vesting
Clause “do[es] not purport to limit the authority of [Congress] to delegate authority to
others”); Thomas W. Merrill, Rethinking Article I, Section 1: From Nondelegation to Exclusive Delegation, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 2097, 2109-14, 2165-66 (2004) (arguing for an exclusive delegation doctrine under which Congress has the exclusive power to decide
when and whether to delegate lawmaking powers).
132
See WERHAN, supra note 120, at 44 -45 (noting that it “would subvert the political
accountability hardwired into the legislative process for Congress to farm out its lawmaking authority to institutions that are less democratic, and therefore less accountable, in their decisionmaking”). But see Jerry L. Mashaw, Prodelegation: Why Administrators Should Make Political Decisions, 1 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 81, 95-96 (1985) (arguing that in
light of the existence of presidential elections, “it may make sense to imagine the delegation of political authority to administrators as a device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires of the electorate”).
133
See 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If Congress shall lay down by legislative act an
intelligible principle to which the person or body authorized to [regulate] is directed
to conform, such legislative action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”).
131
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in the mere execution of a congressional act and not in a legislative
134
capacity.
Although the Court generally has taken an extremely lenient view
135
of the intelligible principle requirement, the nondelegation doc136
trine is not completely dead. Litigants continue to mount nondele137
138
gation challenges, and some judges continue to bite. In addition,
courts sometimes adopt narrow constructions of statutes in order to
“corral[] what might otherwise be a constitutionally excessive delega139
tion of power.” Hence, even in its weakened form, the nondelegation doctrine persists, acting in some ways like the “Energizer Bunny
140
of constitutional law,” as Gary Lawson has put it.

134

Id. at 410-11.
The Court has upheld many vague delegations of power, such as delegations to
regulate in the “public interest.” See NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943)
(upholding Congress’s delegation to the FCC to regulate broadcasting licensing “as public interest, convenience, or necessity” warrant); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., Inc.,
307 U.S. 533, 576-77 (1939) (upholding Congress’s delegation to the Secretary of
Agriculture to regulate milk prices in the “public interest”). Indeed, the Supreme
Court has found the requisite intelligible principle lacking in only two cases, both involving delegations found in the National Industrial Recovery Act of 1933 (NIRA). See
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 541-42 (1935) (ruling
that section 3 of the NIRA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power to
the President); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 414-19 (1935) (ruling that section
9(c) of the NIRA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power).
136
See Lemos, supra note 118, at 419 (arguing that it would be a “mistake” to declare the nondelegation doctrine dead).
137
See, e.g., Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at i, 11-24, Defenders of Wildlife v.
Chertoff, 554 U.S. 918 (2008) (No. 07-1180), 2008 WL 727967 (arguing that section
102(c) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 is
an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power); Gary Lawson, Delegation and Original Meaning, 88 VA. L. REV. 327, 330 (2002) (noting a “series of attempts by lawyers and
judges in the past decade” to keep the nondelegation doctrine alive).
138
See, e.g., Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d 23, 33-40 (D.C.
Cir. 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) (arguing that a statute giving the Secretary of the Interior the power to acquire lands “in his discretion” violated the nondelegation doctrine); Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1034-40 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (holding
that the EPA had relied on a construction of its authority-granting statute that violated
the nondelegation doctrine), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457 (2001); South Dakota v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 69 F.3d
878, 882, 885 (8th Cir. 1995) (holding that delegation to the Secretary of the Interior
to acquire lands “in his discretion” violated the nondelegation doctrine), vacated and
remanded, 519 U.S. 919 (1996).
139
Lemos, supra note 118, at 455; see also Indus. Union Dep’t v. Am. Petroleum
Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 659-62 (1980) (plurality opinion) (requiring the Occupational
Safety and Health Administration to make a finding of significant risk in promulgating
its safety regulations).
140
Lawson, supra note 137, at 330.
135
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In contrast to the longstanding role that the nondelegation doctrine has played in administrative law, the nondelegation doctrine has
been largely absent when it comes to delegations of lawmaking power
to the courts. As Margaret Lemos has thoroughly described, the voluminous scholarship on the nondelegation doctrine thus far has focused primarily on delegations of lawmaking power to administrative
agencies and generally has failed to consider whether the doctrine can
141
or should be used to constrain delegations to courts. This has been
the case even though Congress routinely delegates lawmaking power
142
Lemos, accordingly, has persuasively called for more
to the courts.
conversation about delegations to courts, suggesting that these delegations should not necessarily be immune from nondelegation chal143
lenges.
If one were to apply nondelegation-esque principles to Congress’s
delegation of docket-setting power to the Court, then an “intelligible
principle” would need to be identified. In searching for an intelligible principle, three possible sources seem worthy of consideration:
(1) statutory text defining the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction; (2) legislative history surrounding Congress’s decisions to give the Court a discretionary docket; and (3) the Court’s own published rules. Unfortunately, however, even if these sources were all appropriate places to
search for an intelligible principle, they fail to supply a guiding principle sufficient for even today’s weakened version of the nondelegation doctrine.
1. Statutory Text
Various statutes define the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. For example, 28 U.S.C. § 1254 speaks to the Court’s power to review decisions from the federal courts of appeals, providing that the Court
“may” review cases in the courts of appeals “[b]y writ of certiorari
granted upon the petition of any party to any civil or criminal case,

141

See Lemos, supra note 118, at 421 (“[N]otwithstanding the robust and evergrowing body of law and commentary on the boundaries of permissible delegations to
agencies, we lack any account of the constitutional status of delegations of lawmaking
authority to courts.”).
142
See id. at 428-34 (discussing congressional delegations to the courts and pointing to the Sherman Act as an example of “a clear-cut and self-conscious delegation of
lawmaking power to courts”).
143
See id. at 475-76 (“Nondelegation law and theory ignore courts at their peril . . . . Delegation to courts raise the same constitutional concerns as delegations to
agencies.”).
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144

before or after rendition of judgment or decree.”
Nothing in this
statutory text, however, helps to define when the Court should exercise
its discretion to grant a petition for a writ of certiorari that otherwise
falls within § 1254’s grant of jurisdiction. Similarly, 28 U.S.C. § 1257,
which speaks to the Court’s ability to review final judgments from the
states, provides only that review “may” be had via certiorari
where the validity of a treaty or statute of the United States is drawn in
question or where the validity of a statute of any State is drawn in question on the ground of its being repugnant to the Constitution, treaties,
or laws of the United States, or where any title, right, privilege, or immunity is specially set up or claimed under the Constitution or the treaties or statutes of, or any commission held or authority exercised under,
145
the United States.

Just like § 1254, nothing in § 1257 sets forth a principle to guide when
the Court might refuse to hear a case that otherwise falls within the
146
jurisdiction created by § 1257.
Hence, the statutory text appears to
give the Court unconstrained discretion to refuse to hear a case that
otherwise falls within the Court’s statutorily defined jurisdiction for
any reason or for no reason at all.
2. Legislative History
In searching for an intelligible principle with which to constrain
delegations, the courts have sometimes looked not only to statutory text
147
but also to legislative history. In the certiorari context, however, the
relevant legislative history—like the statutory text—fails to provide any
meaningful criteria that could be read to guide the Court’s discretion.
As Hartnett has described in an article detailing the emergence of
the certiorari process, the legislative history leading up to and surrounding the landmark Judges’ Bill of 1925 contains little clarification
144

28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006).
Id. § 1257.
146
To fit within the Court’s jurisdiction, of course, the statute makes clear that the
judgment below must be “final” and that the judgment must have been rendered by
the “highest court of a State in which a decision could be had.” Id. However, once
these and other statutory requirements are met, the statute says nothing about when
the Court may exercise its discretion to decline to hear a case.
147
See, e.g., Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 375-76 nn.9-10 (1989) (looking to legislative history for elaboration on the purposes of various statutory factors);
Indus. Union Dep’t. v. Am. Petroleum Inst., 448 U.S. 607, 676 (1980) (Rehnquist, J.,
concurring) (“One of the primary sources looked to by this Court in adding gloss to an
otherwise broad grant of legislative authority is the legislative history of the statute in
question.”).
145
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about what specific standards, if any, were to guide the Court’s discre148
tion. In fact, in advocating in 1914 for expanded certiorari jurisdiction, William Howard Taft (later to become Chief Justice and the central proponent of the Judges’ Bill) spoke initially of the need to give
the Court “absolute and arbitrary discretion with respect to all business
149
but constitutional business.”
When Taft subsequently appeared before the House Judiciary
Committee in 1922 (then as Chief Justice) with proposed legislation
150
designed to expand certiorari, Taft described the “proper basis for
determining the class of cases which should be reviewed” in a slightly
more reserved fashion, stating:
The Supreme Court’s function is for the purpose of expounding and
stabilizing principles of law for the benefit of the people of the country, passing
upon constitutional questions and other important questions of law for
the public benefit. It is to preserve uniformity of decision among the in151
termediate courts of appeal.

In addition, Taft explained that “[t]he question is whether the questions as presented are sufficiently important, considering the function
that the Supreme Court has to play—to justify and require the court
152
to let the case into the court for a full hearing on the merits.” This
rather vague description of the principles that would guide the Court
in granting certiorari was about as specific as Taft got.
The additional legislative history surrounding the passage of the
Judges’ Act of 1925 does not supply any more precise standards. At
most, the legislative history provides repeated promises from the Justices about how certiorari was to be used to review cases of “public im-

148

See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1660-704 (detailing at length the history of certiorari, including the Judges’ Bill of 1925).
149
William H. Taft, The Attacks on the Courts and Legal Procedure, 5 KY. L.J. 3, 18
(1916) (emphasis added).
150
For a discussion of Taft’s role in lobbying the Court for passage of the Judges’
Bill, see Buchman, supra note 18, at 3. Buchman states that “Taft’s campaign can be
explained best by the interaction of two factors: a lobbying campaign designed to emphasize the belief that the bill implicated merely technical matters, and congruence
between the policy preferences of a congressional majority and the Court.” Id.; see also
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1660-704 (discussing Taft’s prominent role in the lobbying
process).
151
Jurisdiction of the Circuit Courts of Appeals and United States Supreme Court: Hearing
on H.R. 10479 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 67th Cong. 2 (1922) [hereinafter
Hearing on H.R. 10479] (statement of Chief Justice William H. Taft) (emphasis added).
152
Id.
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153

portance,” cases that needed to be decided to serve the “public ben154
155
efit,” and cases that create a conflict in the courts.
In addition,
the Justices promised to grant review when the circuit courts “certi156
fied” the questions arising in the case.
These sorts of vague promises made primarily by members of the
Court itself, however, seem insufficient to provide a congressionally
157
In hindsight, it seems quite clear
imposed “intelligible principle.”
that these vague statements made by the Justices have not in fact of158
fered any kind of meaningful constraint on the Court’s discretion.
For example, contrary to what the Justices promised, it is not unheard
of for the Court today to deny certiorari petitions even when a circuit
159
conflict is presented.
Similarly, despite the Justices’ reassurances
153

See, e.g., Procedure in Federal Courts: Hearing on S. 2060 and S. 2061 Before a Subcomm. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th Cong. 21 (1924) (reporting that “[i]f this bill
becomes law, every case now reviewable in the Supreme Court will still be subject to
review there, if the court finds that it presents any question which should, in the public
interest, engage its attention”); Jurisdiction of Circuit Courts of Appeals and of the Supreme
Court of the United States: Hearing on H.R. 8206 Before the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 68th
Cong. 7 (1924) [hereinafter Hearing on H.R. 8206] (statement of Justice Willis Van Devanter) (suggesting that the Court would grant cases that presented questions “of public
importance or of wide general interest”); id. at 22 (statement of Justice James C. McReynolds) (emphasizing that the Court should not decide a case unless it is “of particular
importance” or it “involves[s] something more than the mere rights of the litigants”).
154
Hearing on H.R. 10479, supra note 151, at 2 (statement of Chief Justice William
H. Taft).
155
See id. (“Whenever a petition for certiorari presents a question on which one
circuit court of appeals differs from another, then we let the case come into our court
as a matter of course.”).
156
See id., at 3; see also Hearing on H.R. 8206, supra note 153, at 8 (statement of Justice Willis Van Devanter) (indicating that the Court would grant cases that needed to
be decided “in the interest of uniformity”).
157
Even if the legislative history could be said to supply some kind of a guiding
principle, there is also the question of whether legislative history alone can supply the
requisite intelligible principle or whether the principle must be tethered to some ambiguous statutory text. See, e.g., Mich. Gambling Opposition v. Kempthorne, 525 F.3d
23, 38 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (Brown, J., dissenting) (“[E]ven in a nondelegation challenge,
a court must find meaning for an ambiguous phrase in some relevant text.”).
158
Cf. Stevens, supra note 80, at 14 (rejecting the notion that “representations
made to Congress when the 1925 Judges’ Bill was enacted created some sort of estoppel that would make it dishonorable for the Court to change the Rule of Four”).
159
See, e.g., Hiersche v. United States, 503 U.S. 923, 925 (1992) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (defending the Court’s denial of certiorari and arguing that “[s]ome conflicts are tolerable”); Beaulieu v. United States, 497 U.S. 1038,
1039 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (noting he had dissented from the denial of certiorari forty-eight times that term because “there were conflicts among Courts of Appeals sufficiently crystallized to warrant certiorari” and that he had dissented seven
other times where there were “differences on the same federal issue between Courts of
Appeals and state courts”).
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that the Court would decide issues certified by the lower courts, the
Court has essentially killed the practice of certification, effectively
160
rendering it “a dead letter.”
3. Supreme Court Rule 10
The Supreme Court’s own rules provide a final place to look for
some kind of intelligible principle that could guide the Court’s discretion. Specifically, Rule 10 might be thought to serve as a legal text setting forth a constraining principle. However, even a quick reading of
Rule 10 demonstrates that this is not the case:
Review on a writ of certiorari is not a matter of right, but of judicial discretion. A petition for a writ of certiorari will be granted only for compelling reasons. The following, although neither controlling nor fully measuring
the Court’s discretion, indicate the character of the reasons the Court considers:
(a) a United States court of appeals has entered a decision in conflict
with the decision of another United States court of appeals on the same
important matter; has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with a decision by a state court of last resort; or has so far
departed from the accepted and usual course of judicial proceedings, or
sanctioned such a departure by a lower court, as to call for an exercise of
this Court’s supervisory power;
(b) a state court of last resort has decided an important federal question in a way that conflicts with the decision of another state court of last
resort or of a United States court of appeals;
(c) a state court or a United States court of appeals has decided an
important question of federal law that has not been, but should be, settled by this Court, or has decided an important federal question in a way
that conflicts with relevant decisions of this Court.
A petition for a writ of certiorari is rarely granted when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a
161
properly stated rule of law.

As the text of the rule itself admits, Rule 10 does not set forth
162
binding factors.
Rather, the rule merely sets forth some relevant,
160

Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1712; see also Aaron Nielson, The Death of the Supreme
Court’s Certified Question Jurisdiction, 59 CATH. U. L. REV. 483, 487 (2010) (noting that
the last time the Court even mentioned certification was more than twelve years earlier
in 1996 (citing Felker v. Turpin, 518 U.S. 651, 667 (1996))); Tyler, supra note 11, at
1319 (proposing that the Court resume using the process of certification).
161
SUP. CT. R. 10 (emphasis added).
162
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1721 (explaining that Rule 10 fails to provide controlling standards).
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163

nonbinding considerations.
Some of these considerations might
well operate in practice as the functional equivalent of jurisdictiondefining rules. For example, Rule 10 makes clear that a petition for
certiorari will rarely be granted “when the asserted error consists of erroneous factual findings or the misapplication of a properly stated rule
164
of law,” and the Court has been quite unyielding in refusing to take
165
Yet
cases that are splitless or involve fact-bound error correction.
given that the rule expressly reserves the Court’s discretion, it seems
difficult to say that Rule 10 sets forth a constraining principle.
Furthermore, even if Rule 10 could be read as a constraining
principle, it still does not supply the kind of intelligible principle that
would be required if the traditional nondelegation doctrine were applied. This is because the relevant question in nondelegation challenges is whether Congress has set down via “legislative act an intelligible
principle to which the person or body authorized to [act] is directed
166
to conform.”
As Justice Scalia explained in Whitman v. American
Trucking Ass’ns, an agency cannot “cure an unlawful delegation of legislative power by adopting in its discretion a limiting construction of
167
In the certiorari context, there is no such limiting
the statute.”
principle set forth by Congress. Hence, Congress’s delegation to the
Court is not constrained by the kind of guiding principle—not even a
vague, open-ended standard—that exists in a congressional delegation
to an administrative agency.
B. Softer Mechanisms for Control
The fact that current certiorari practices would fail any strict application of the nondelegation doctrine might not be all that troub-

163

See SUP. CT. R. 10 (noting that the considerations listed are neither binding nor
exclusive); see also BICKEL, supra note 15, at 126 (“The Court’s own rule on the subject
says that it neither controls nor fully measures the Court’s discretion, and, broad as it
is, the rule does not in fact do so.”).
164
SUP. CT. R. 10.
165
See Matthew L.M. Fletcher, Factbound and Splitless: The Certiorari Process as Barrier
to Justice for Indian Tribes, 51 ARIZ. L. REV. 933, 980 (2009) (“The Court will agree to decide few ‘splitless’ or ‘factbound’ cases unless there are extraordinary circumstances,
such as unusual importance to the question or an atypical lower court error.”).
166
Whitman v. Am. Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 472 (2001) (alteration in original) (emphasis added) (quoting J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S.
394, 409 (1928)); see also id. at 473 (“The idea that an agency can cure an unconstitutionally standardless delegation of power by declining to exercise some of that power
seems to us internally contradictory.”).
167
Id. at 472.
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ling, given that courts have largely abandoned direct enforcement of
the intelligible principle requirement, even in the administrative law
168
context. But in the administrative law world, substantial delegations
of significant policymaking power to agencies have been allowed in
large part because a variety of more informal mechanisms for constraint—including political oversight, judicial review, public participation, and reason-giving requirements—operate to check administrative discretion and to facilitate accountability and transparency. In the
certiorari context, these more informal mechanisms for constraint are
absent.
1. Political Accountability and Oversight
Political accountability and oversight are two of the most signifi169
cant checks on agency discretion.
Although agency heads are not
170
directly accountable to the people, the heads of both independent
and executive agencies are subject to varying degrees of political con171
trol from the President, Congress, or both.
Congress, for example,
172
In addition, Congress
creates agencies and controls their budgets.
can influence agency policymaking via oversight hearings, as well as
173
through more informal communications.
Similarly, the President
174
plays a “unique role . . . in overseeing agency action.” The President,
for example, has the power to appoint and remove certain agency officials (although independent agency heads are insulated from the
168

See Lemos, supra note 118, at 418-19 (noting that the Supreme Court has not
directly enforced the nondelegation doctrine in decades).
169
See 3 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 17.4, at 1246.
170
See Philip J. Harter, Executive Oversight of Rulemaking: The President Is No Stranger,
36 AM. U. L. REV. 557, 568 (1987) (“We vote for presidents, not secretaries or administrators.”).
171
See Kathryn A. Watts, Proposing a Place for Politics in Arbitrary and Capricious Review, 119 YALE L.J. 2, 35-37 (2009); see also FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc., 129 S.
Ct. 1800, 1815 (2009) (“[I]ndependent agencies are sheltered not from politics but
from the President, and it has often been observed that their freedom from presidential oversight (and protection) has simply been replaced by increased subservience to
congressional direction.”); Elena Kagan, Presidential Administration, 114 HARV. L. REV.
2245, 2384 (2001) (“Presidential administration . . . advances political accountability by
subjecting the bureaucracy to the control mechanism most open to public examination and most responsive to public opinion.”).
172
See Jack M. Beermann, Congressional Administration, 43 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 61, 84
(2006) (“One way in which Congress has supervised agencies . . . is through the appropriations process. The power of the purse is among Congress’s most potent weapons in its effort to control the execution of the laws.”).
173
See id. at 121-35.
174
Watts, supra note 171, at 35.
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175

President’s at-will removal powers). The President can also pressure
or steer agency decisionmakers via informal mechanisms, like jawbon176
ing, as well as more formal mechanisms, such as executive orders.
Indeed, in recent years, many have come to see the legitimacy of
the administrative state as hinging on the notion that agencies are politically accountable because of their relationship with Congress and
177
the President.
The Supreme Court, for example, famously explained the legitimacy of judicial deference to agencies in 1984 in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., by relying
on the notion that agencies are accountable to the “Chief Executive,”
178
who is “directly accountable to the people.” Similarly, in arguing in
favor of the permissibility of broad delegations of legislative power to
administrative agencies, some scholars have relied upon the democratic accountability of agencies, with prominent scholars like Jerry
Mashaw emphasizing that delegations to agencies may actually be a
“device for improving the responsiveness of government to the desires
179
of the general electorate.”
In contrast to the heads of agencies, the Justices of the Supreme
180
Court are insulated from direct political oversight and control.
Although the Justices are chosen by the President with the advice and
consent of the Senate, they enjoy salary protections and life tenure

175

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (enumerating the President’s appointment
powers and constraints thereon); Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 670-71 (1988) (discussing the President’s appointment and removal powers and noting that principal
officers may only be selected by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate, but that inferior officers may be appointed by “the President alone, by the heads
of departments, or by the Judiciary,” in Congress’s discretion); see also Watts, supra note
171, at 57-62 (explaining that while the President does not enjoy removal power over
independent agency heads, he can use other means to control independent agencies,
such as informal contacts and pressure).
176
See generally Nicholas Bagley & Richard L. Revesz, Centralized Oversight of the Regulatory State, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1260, 1261 (2006) (describing how Reagan “tapped
the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to review agency rulemaking and help
streamline the administrative state”); Paul R. Verkuil, Jawboning Administrative Agencies:
Ex Parte Contacts by the White House, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 943, 944-47 (1980) (discussing the
various modes of interaction between the Carter Administration and federal agencies).
177
See generally Watts, supra note 171, at 35-39 (describing the rise of the politicalcontrol model of agency decisionmaking).
178
467 U.S. 837, 865 (1984).
179
JERRY L. MASHAW, GREED, CHAOS, AND GOVERNANCE: USING PUBLIC CHOICE TO
IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 152 (1997).
180
See Lemos, supra note 118, at 449-50 (noting that courts are not subject to the
same political controls as agencies).
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181

subject only to impeachment.
Congress does have some ability to
exert indirect control over the Court by using the Exceptions Clause
182
to limit the Court’s jurisdiction, acting under its Spending Clause
183
powers to cut back on the Court’s budget, or exercising its general
lawmaking powers to overturn a statutory construction rendered by
184
the Court. In addition, because the Court enjoys neither the power
of the purse nor the sword, the Court depends on the coordinate
branches and the American public to enforce and follow its judg185
ments. Otherwise, however, the members of the Court—unlike the
heads of agencies—are insulated from direct political oversight.
2. Public Participation
Public participation is yet another way in which administrative discretion—at least in the rulemaking realm—is subject to significant external checks. When promulgating rules via informal notice-andcomment rulemaking, for example, agencies generally must provide
public notice of the proposed rulemaking, allow the public to submit
comments responding to the proposed rulemaking, and respond in a

181

See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1 (“The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior
Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their
Continuance in Office.”).
182
See id. § 2 (giving Congress the power to make exceptions to the Supreme
Court’s appellate jurisdiction). For literature discussing the longstanding debate
about the extent of Congress’s powers to strip the Court of jurisdiction to hear particular kinds of cases (such as cases involving abortion or school prayer), see generally
Leonard G. Ratner, Congressional Power over the Appellate Jurisdiction of the Supreme Court,
109 U. PA. L. REV. 157 (1960), and Lawrence Gene Sager, Foreword: Constitutional Limitations on Congress’ Authority to Regulate the Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 95 HARV. L.
REV. 17 (1981).
183
See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1 (“The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common
Defence and general Welfare of the United States . . . .”). See generally Eugenia Froedge
Toma, Congressional Influence and the Supreme Court: The Budget as a Signaling Device, 20 J.
LEGAL STUD. 131, 132-35 (1991) (discussing Congress’s control over the Court’s budget as a mechanism to signal its satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the Court’s decisionmaking).
184
See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Overriding Supreme Court Statutory Interpretation Decisions, 101 YALE L.J. 331, 338 (1991) (providing an empirical analysis showing
that Congress overrides the Supreme Court’s decisions interpreting statutes on average
ten times per Congress).
185
Cf. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE 369-72 (2009) (arguing that the
Court listens closely to and is in dialogue with the public and political actors).
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reasoned way to all significant public comments.
Interested members of the modern tech-savvy public have to go no further than their
computers to easily locate proposed rules and file comments electron187
ically.
In addition, interested members of the public can petition
agencies to engage in rulemaking, thereby playing a role in setting
188
agency agendas.
Hence, rulemaking proceedings conducted by
agencies are quite accessible to the public.
Unlike notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings that have
the benefit of public participation, the Court’s certiorari decisions are
made behind closed doors and cannot easily be monitored by Con189
gress, the President, or the public.
In making certiorari decisions,
the Court generally relies only upon the opinion below, the written
submissions of the parties to the case, and any briefs filed at the certiorari stage by amici curiae who have the means to hire an attorney
190
Accorand pay the costs of drafting and printing a formal brief.
dingly, opportunities for general public input on specific certiorari
petitions do not exist.
The public did not have an opportunity to comment on or participate in the rulemaking process for Supreme Court Rule 10, which defines the factors that the Court may take into account when granting
191
or denying certiorari.
A federal statute granting the federal courts
general powers to promulgate “rules for the conduct of their business”
does call for courts to give the public notice and an opportunity for
comment on proposed rules, but that statute explicitly exempts the
192
Supreme Court from these requirements.
The Supreme Court, accordingly, is not required to offer an opportunity for public comment
186

See generally 1 PIERCE, supra note 99, at §§ 7.3–7.4 (discussing notice and comment requirements).
187
See REGULATIONS.GOV, http://www.regulations.gov (last visited Oct. 15, 2011)
(enabling members of the public to search for proposed rules, submit and read comments, and locate final rules).
188
See 5 U.S.C. § 553(e) (2006) (“Each agency shall give an interested person the
right to petition for the issuance, amendment, or repeal of a rule.”).
189
See generally 3 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 17.4, at 1247-48 (noting that various procedural requirements, such as the requirement that agencies obtain the views of interested parties, help to shape the exercise of agency discretion).
190
See infra text accompanying notes 304 -05 (arguing for greater public participation as amici curiae).
191
See SUP. CT. R. 10 (listing considerations important to the Court in deciding
whether to grant certiorari).
192
See 28 U.S.C. § 2071(b) (2006) (“Any rule prescribed by a court, other than the
Supreme Court, under subsection (a) shall be prescribed only after giving appropriate
public notice and an opportunity for comment.”(emphasis added)).
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in its rulemaking process and did not elect to do so until 1995 —
long after the basic language currently found in Rule 10 had already
194
been codified.
3. Judicial Review
Another method of oversight applicable to agency discretion but
195
Courts play
not the Court’s certiorari discretion is judicial review.
an important role in reviewing many kinds of agency actions to ensure
that the actions are not arbitrary and do not contravene statutory,
regulatory, or constitutional principles. A prominent example of this
can be seen in the Supreme Court’s recent decision in Massachusetts v.
EPA, in which the Court took the EPA to task for supplying improper
reasons in denying a petition asking the EPA to regulate emissions
196
that lead to global warming.
Although there is a presumption of judicial review in the adminis197
trative law world, not all agency action is judicially reviewable. Indeed, some agency decisions involving questions of resource allocation,
such as nonenforcement decisions or refusals to reconsider, are pre198
sumptively exempted from judicial review. However, even when judi-

193

See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at ix (“Starting with the revision in 1995, the
Court added a new element to its rule-making process: making proposed rule changes
available for public comment before finalizing them.”).
194
Although Rule 10 has changed slightly through the years, the basic language
found in the current rule can be traced back to a Court rule adopted just months after
the passage of the Judges’ Bill of 1925. See William Howard Taft, The Jurisdiction of the
Supreme Court Under the Act of February 13, 1925, 35 YALE L.J. 1, 3 (1925) (“The Court has
thought it wise to indicate the lines along which its discretion will be exercised in
granting certioraris, in Par. 5 of Rule 35 of the new Rules adopted by the Court in June
last, to square with the new Act.”); see also Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1721 (“Although
this rule has changed a bit over time . . . the basic thrust remains the same and the
opening provision is nearly identical.”).
195
See 3 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 17.2, at 1233 (“At least part of the solution to the
problem of agency discretion must lie in judicial review of agency actions.”).
196
549 U.S. 497, 532-35 (2007).
197
See 5 U.S.C. §§ 701(a), 704 (2006) (providing for judicial review and enumerating the two instances in which the presumption favoring judicial review is rebuttable:
when the “action is committed to agency discretion by law” or the “statutes preclude
judicial review”); Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140 (1967) (noting that both
case law and the Administrative Procedure Act support the presumption of judicial review of agency action).
198
See ICC v. Bhd. of Locomotive Eng’rs, 482 U.S. 270, 280 (1987) (holding an
agency denial of a request for reconsideration to be unreviewable); Heckler v. Chaney,
470 U.S. 821, 828-31 (1985) (holding that agency nonenforcement decisions are presumptively nonreviewable). See generally Eric Biber, The Importance of Resource Allocation
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cial review is not available (for example, in the nonenforcement con199
text), political review nonetheless operates to check agency decisions.
In the certiorari context, judicial review of the Court’s certiorari
decisions by some other judicial body does not occur because the
200
Court is the highest court in our country. Nor are the Court’s certiorari decisions subject to any kind of meaningful review by Congress,
the President, or members of the public, given that the Court does
not explain its certiorari decisions and generally does not disclose individual Justices’ votes on certiorari petitions. Hence, unlike agency
decisions that generally are subject to judicial or political review, or
both, neither judicial nor political review operates to constrain the
Court’s certiorari decisions.
4. Reason Giving
Finally, certiorari is unconstrained by another procedural mechanism that plays a prominent role in administrative law: a “reasongiving” requirement. In administrative law, reason-giving requirements appear in various places. Section 555(e) of the Administrative
Procedure Act (APA), for example, requires federal agencies to provide a “brief statement of the grounds for denial” when denying writ201
ten petitions or applications. Accordingly, when agencies deny petitions asking them to engage in rulemaking or to initiate enforcement
202
actions, the agency must give reasons for the denial. Similarly, when
an agency engaged in informal adjudication denies a written application or a petition made in connection with an agency proceeding, the
203
agency must provide a “‘brief statement of the grounds for denial.’”
in Administrative Law, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 1, 10-13 (2008) (discussing confusion in the
law concerning judicial review of agency inaction and resource allocation issues).
199
Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Judicial Review of Agency Inaction: An Arbitrariness Approach, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1657, 1658-60, 1714 -17 (2004) (recognizing that under the
current state of the law, agency decisions not to act are subject to political rather than
judicial control, but arguing that the law should be altered to allow room for courts to
provide a check against arbitrary agency inaction).
200
The Court itself could reconsider a certiorari decision, but such reconsideration rarely occurs. See SUP. CT. R. 44.2 (allowing for petitions for rehearing of orders
denying certiorari); GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 520 (noting that the majority of
petitions for rehearing are filed “without any basis”).
201
5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006).
202
Id.; see also Ronald M. Levin, Understanding Unreviewability in Administrative Law,
74 MINN. L. REV. 689, 765 (1990) (noting that section 555(e) of the APA requires an
agency to furnish a written explanation when it denies either a rulemaking petition or
a petition for enforcement action).
203
1 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 8.5, at 546 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 555(e)).
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Section 706(2)(A) of the APA is the source of another reasongiving requirement. Section 706(2)(A), which subjects agency action
204
to so-called “arbitrary and capricious review” by the federal courts,
has been read to require agencies to provide adequate reasons for
205
their decisions. In the 1983 case Motor Vehicle Manufacturers Ass’n of
the United States, Inc. v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., the
Court explained this obligation as follows: “[T]he agency must examine the relevant data and articulate a satisfactory explanation for its
action including a rational connection between the facts found and
206
the choice made.” Taking their cue from State Farm, agencies today
routinely provide lengthy explanations for any actions that will be subjected to arbitrariness review under § 706(2)(A). For example, agencies generally accompany their newly announced rules with detailed
discussions of the relevant statute, any underlying data, explanations
of the agency’s methods of reasoning, and responses to public com207
ments received by the agency.
These reason-giving requirements mainly exist to ensure that
208
agencies do not act in an arbitrary manner. In fact, the permissibility of Congress’s decision to delegate broad legislative and adjudicatory
discretion to agencies has, in many ways, hinged on the existence of
the reason-giving requirement. This requirement enables the courts,
the political branches, and the public to examine the reasons supporting agency exercise of delegated discretion and to guard against arbi209
trariness.
In contrast to the reason-giving requirement that agencies gener210
ally face, Congress has left the Court free to make certiorari deci204

5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A).
See Watts, supra note 171, at 14 (discussing the reason-giving requirement imposed by arbitrary and capricious review).
206
463 U.S. 29, 43 (1983) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
207
See 1 PIERCE, supra note 99, § 7.4, at 441–50; Watts, supra note 171, at 14.
208
Cf. Lisa Schultz Bressman, Beyond Accountability: Arbitrariness and Legitimacy in
the Administrative State, 78 N.Y.U. L. REV. 461, 496 (2003) (describing how failing to
demonstrate reasoned decisionmaking can be indicative of arbitrary action).
209
See, e.g., Sidney A. Shapiro & Richard E. Levy, Heightened Scrutiny of the Fourth
Branch: Separation of Powers and the Requirement of Adequate Reasons for Agency Decisions,
1987 DUKE L.J. 387, 423-25 (arguing that the heightened reason-giving requirement
articulated in State Farm flows from separation of powers principles and responds to the
broad delegations of legislative authority given to agencies); cf. Cynthia R. Farina, Statutory Interpretation and the Balance of Power in the Administrative State, 89 COLUM. L. REV.
452, 487 (1989) (noting that “the permissibility of delegating regulatory power” has
hinged on the courts’ ability to review agency exercises of delegated power).
210
Not all agency action is subject to a judicially enforceable reason-giving requirement. Nonenforcement decisions, for example, are not subjected to any judicially en205
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sions without providing any reasons. Nor has the Court chosen to limit itself by imposing a reason-giving requirement on certiorari deci211
sions. In most cases, no explanation is given. This differentiates the
Court’s certiorari process from agency actions that are subject to reason-giving requirements, like denials of rulemaking petitions or denials of petitions seeking enforcement actions.
It also distinguishes the Court’s certiorari powers from other areas
in which the federal courts sometimes decline to exercise jurisdiction.
As David Shapiro has described, historically the federal courts have enjoyed the power to decline some jurisdiction given to them based on
212
“principled” exercises of discretion. Shapiro explains that these decisions generally involve the application of identifiable criteria that
are “capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts,
evaluated by critics of the courts’ work, and reviewed by the legislative
213
For example, various justiciability doctrines with prudenbranch.”
tial aspects like standing, ripeness, and the political-question doctrine
214
enable the courts to make choices about which cases to hear.
Similarly, courts sometimes invoke abstention doctrines rooted in notions

forced reason-giving requirement by virtue of the fact that there is “no law to apply.”
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-32 (1984). Such decisions are nonetheless still
subject to other checks, such as political oversight, and perhaps to constitutional
checks like the nondelegation doctrine. See Sandra B. Zellmer, The Devil, the Details,
and the Dawn of the 21st Century Administrative State: Beyond the New Deal, 32 ARIZ. ST. L. J.
941, 989 (2000) (noting that decisions that are committed entirely to an agency’s discretion “would seem a prime target for nondelegation challenges”). In addition, the
APA helps facilitate political oversight of some nonenforcement decisions by requiring
agencies to furnish written explanations when petitions for enforcement are denied. 5
U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006); see also Levin, supra note 202, at 765-66 (fleshing out the requirements of § 555(e)).
211
Cf. Frederick Schauer, Giving Reasons, 47 STAN. L. REV. 633, 634, 637 (1995)
(noting that when the Court makes certiorari decisions, “the conclusion stands alone,
unsupported by reasons, justifications, or explanations”); see also supra notes 88-90 and
accompanying text.
212
David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 578 (1985).
213
Id.; see also id. at 589 (arguing that courts should enjoy some discretion in matters relating to federal jurisdiction but that “the process is one that calls not only for
the continued involvement and articulated reasoning of trial and appellate courts, and
for careful elaboration of their decisions, but also for continued oversight by the legislative branch”).
214
See id. at 552-55 (“[A] variety of cases reveal that the concepts falling under the
heading of justiciability have a constitutional core, and that each concept has a penumbra within which the Court sees itself as having discretion whether to exercise jurisdiction.”); see also BICKEL, supra note 15, at 125 (noting the doctrines of standing and
ripeness as examples of “available devices of ‘not doing’”).

WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

University of Pennsylvania Law Review

42

11/17/2011 11:46 AM

[Vol. 160: 1

of comity and federalism to avoid deciding cases that fall within the
215
jurisdiction conferred upon them by Congress.
However, unlike judicial decisions that provide explanations as to
why a court declines to grant prudential standing in a given case or
why it decides to abstain from hearing a case due to federalism concerns, contemporary exercise of certiorari does not fit within the type
of “principled discretion” described by Shapiro. Certiorari does not
involve the application of identifiable criteria that are “capable of being articulated and openly applied by the courts, evaluated by critics
216
of the courts’ work, and reviewed by the legislative branch.” Rather,
as a result of Congress’s vague delegation to the Court, the Court’s
discretion to “grant or deny review of cases within [its certiorari] jurisdiction is limited only by any guidelines that the Court chooses to
217
impose on itself.”
IV. CHECKING THE COURT’S DISCRETION: SOME POSSIBLE
SOLUTIONS BASED ON ADMINISTRATIVE LAW PRINCIPLES
In thinking about how the Court’s discretion might be reformed
to help legitimate and constrain the Court’s certiorari process, various
lessons drawn from administrative law are worthy of serious consideration. First, analogizing to the nondelegation doctrine, this Part considers whether Congress should attempt to legislate an “intelligible
principle” to guide the Court’s discretion. Second, this Part examines
whether the reason-giving requirement found in administrative law
suggests the need to mandate greater disclosure in the certiorari
process, either through a traditional reason-giving requirement or
some other type of vote-disclosure requirement. Third, this Part analyzes whether the Court—inspired by public-participation mechanisms
used by administrative agencies—should become more willing to solicit views on the cert-worthiness of cases from knowledgeable outsiders.
Ultimately, this Part concludes that although it might be advisable for
Congress to set forth an “intelligible principle” to guide certiorari decisions in order to ward off any possible nondelegation-esque con215

See Shapiro, supra note 212, at 550-52. Certain abstention doctrines have been
criticized as inconsistent with separation of powers. See, e.g., Martin H. Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 76 (1984)
(arguing that judge-made abstention doctrines used in the federalism context “could
be characterized as a judicial usurpation of legislative authority, in violation of the principle of separation of powers”).
216
Shapiro, supra note 212, at 578.
217
Id. at 562.
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cerns, a vote-disclosure requirement and increased opportunities for
public participation offer the most promising and feasible means to
improve accountability and to increase monitoring opportunities.
A. Legislating More Specific Standards
The most obvious way to provide a check on the Court’s certiorari
discretion would be for Congress to pass legislation that more specifi218
cally delineates the standards to be used in certiorari decisions.
In
other words, inspired by the nondelegation doctrine, Congress could
pass legislation setting forth an “intelligible principle” to guide the
Court’s discretion and to force the Court to consider specific factors
219
when making certiorari decisions.
As Congress has often done in the administrative context, it would
be fairly simple for Congress to add a vague legislative standard—like
“in the public interest” or “based on the public importance”—to the
statutes that currently govern the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction. A statute in Maryland, for instance, provides that the state’s highest court
should grant certiorari if the court determines that review is “desirable
220
and in the public interest.” Similarly, in 1975, Canada’s parliament
gave Canada’s Supreme Court wide discretion to hear any case that
the Court determines should be decided by “‘reason of its public importance or the importance of any issue of law or any issue of mixed
221
law and fact involved in such question.’”
218

Alternatively, a constitutional amendment might enumerate factors to guide
the Court’s power of discretionary review. See, e.g., GA. CONST. art. VI, § 6, para. 5
(“The Supreme Court may review by certiorari cases in the Court of Appeals which are
of gravity or great public importance.”); OHIO CONST. art. IV, § 2(B)(2)(e) (“In cases
of public or great general interest, the Supreme Court may direct any court of appeals
to certify its record to the Supreme Court, and may review and affirm, modify, or reverse the judgment of the court of appeals.”). However, a constitutional amendment
not only seems highly unlikely, but also might well be undesirable because it would
take valuable flexibility away from Congress.
219
An additional benefit of having Congress legislate more specific certiorari
standards would be that litigants could be sanctioned for filing frivolous certiorari petitions. Estreicher and Sexton have suggested that the Supreme Court adopt a rule analogous to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Estreicher & Sexton, supra
note 98, at 801-02. This might discourage the filing of frivolous petitions, allowing the
Court to focus more closely on meritorious petitions.
220
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-203 (LexisNexis 2006).
221
See ROY B. FLEMMING, TOURNAMENT OF APPEALS: GRANTING JUDICIAL REVIEW
IN CANADA 5 (2004) (noting that “[t]he 1975 reform gave Canada’s Supreme Court
wide latitude, declaring that the decision to grant leave to appeal rested on the Court’s
determination of the ‘public importance’ of issues raised by an application”) (quoting
Supreme Court Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. S-26, s. 40(1) (Can.)).
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The addition of an elastic standard along these lines would likely
be enough to provide the intelligible principle required by today’s
222
weakened nondelegation doctrine. Indeed, adding such a standard
might well be advisable to avoid any potential nondelegation concerns. In terms of constraining effects, however, such a “public importance” standard might at most preclude a Justice who agrees that a
case raises issues of great public importance from voting to deny the
case for purely political or strategic reasons. This standard might also
preclude the Court from taking into account the quality of the lawyering when deciding whether to grant certiorari. For the most part,
however, it would seem that the addition of such a vague standard
223
would do little to truly constrain the Court.
The next question, accordingly, becomes whether it would be desirable for Congress to legislate more specific, detailed certiorari stan224
In the past,
dards that would have a greater constraining effect.
some have argued that Congress should try to more carefully delineate the kinds of cases that warrant certiorari review. Herbert Wechsler, for example, argued in 1961 that “much would be gained if the
governing statutes could be revised to play a larger part in the delineation of the causes that make rightful call upon the time and energy of
225
The fact that Congress has not done so—
the Supreme Court.”
222

See, e.g., NBC v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225-26 (1943) (holding that a congressional delegation to the Federal Communications Commission to regulate broadcasting licensing for “public interest, convenience or necessity” was not unconstitutionally vague); United States v. Rock Royal Coop., 307 U.S. 533, 574-77 (1939)
(upholding a delegation to the Secretary of Agriculture to regulate milk prices in the
“public interest”).
223
Cf. State v. Tyson, 544 S.E.2d 444, 446 (Ga. 2001) (noting that a Georgia constitutional provision giving the Georgia Supreme Court the power to review by certiorari
cases in the Court of Appeals which are of “gravity or great public importance” places
“no limit” on the court’s certiorari jurisdiction).
224
Various state statutes might provide clues about how this could be done. For
example, a New Mexico statute provides that its supreme court has jurisdiction to review via certiorari decisions of the court of appeals that (1) conflict with a decision of
the supreme court; (2) conflict with a decision of the court of appeals; (3) involve a
“significant question of law under the constitution of New Mexico or the United
States”; or (4) involve an issue of “substantial public interest that should be determined by the supreme court.” N.M. STAT. ANN. § 34-5-14 B (1996). The Supreme
Court in New Mexico appears to pay attention to these four statutory factors—it has
indicated that there are “four grounds” on which the court may grant certiorari. Paule
v. Santa Fe Cnty. Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs, 117 P.3d 240, 246 (2005); see also N.M. R. APP.
P. 12-502(C)(2) (requiring petitioners to state the basis for granting certiorari, including whether any of the four statutory factors are present).
225
HERBERT WECHSLER, PRINCIPLES, POLITICS, AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 15 (1961).
Estreicher and Sexton have made a related but different suggestion, arguing that the
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despite mounting criticism of the certiorari process—seems to highlight a fairly widely held assumption: certiorari decisions are driven by
a variety of factors, including the importance of the questions, the
presence of a conflict in the lower courts, the need for further perco226
lation of the issues, and the need for clarification of the law. Hence,
227
some level of flexibility seems desirable in certiorari decisions.
Just
as it has proven undesirable for Congress to speak with great specificity in many areas of the law that benefit from administrative flexibili228
ty, it would seem undesirable and perhaps quite difficult for Congress to specify precisely the Court’s jurisdiction in a way that would
preclude the Court from exercising some judgment about which cases
should be heard. After all, as Alexander Bickel and Doris Provine
have described, the Court’s power not to hear cases is “part of the
foundation of its institutional strength,” enabling the Court to “sidestep or postpone politically damaging disputes” or to “respond to
229
changing litigation patterns.”
Consistent with this notion that flexibility is valuable in the agendasetting process, most states have chosen to leave their highest courts
Court itself should “develop more specific criteria for selecting cases for review” because
“[t]he lack of meaningful criteria contributes to overgranting and overpetitioning, because litigants can never be certain whether their cases merit review.” Estreicher &
Sexton, supra note 98, at 800.
226
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 233-310 (describing numerous factors that
motivate the Court’s exercise of jurisdiction); Ashutosh Bhagwat, Separate but Equal?:
The Supreme Court, The Lower Federal Courts, and the Nature of the “Judicial Power,” 80 B.U.
L. REV. 967, 979-80 (2000) (noting that the Court sometimes takes the need for percolation into account when deciding whether to grant certiorari). But see REHNQUIST,
supra note 38, at 235 (suggesting that “there are really only two or three factors involved in the certiorari decision—conflict with other courts, general importance, and
perception that the decision is wrong in light of Supreme Court precedent”).
227
See, e.g., Hearing on H.R. 8206, supra note 153, at 21 (statement of Justice James
C. McReynolds) (“It is almost impossible to define [the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction]
with sufficient accuracy and certainty, and there ought to be some flexibility, and that
flexibility is gained by means of the application for certiorari.”); Hearing on H.R. 10479,
supra note 151, at 3 (statement of Chief Justice William H. Taft) (rejecting the idea
that the Court’s jurisdiction be limited via careful congressional delineation because
“it is a very difficult thing to include all the important cases, and it is a very difficult
thing to exclude the unimportant cases”); Meador, supra note 122, at 660 (“Any [congressional] effort to define by statute the types of cases to which the Court would be
required to devote its limited resources would likely be either over-inclusive or underinclusive.”).
228
See The Supreme Court, 2009 Term—Leading Cases, 124 HARV. L. REV. 360, 368
(2010) (“Legislatures often pass laws in broad terms to allow flexibility for future developments or to defer details to specialized executive agencies.”).
229
PROVINE, supra note 22, at 72; see also BICKEL, supra note 15, at 111-98 (describing “passive virtues” whereby courts might choose not to hear certain cases).
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230

with docket-setting discretion. In Kansas, for example, a statute lists
various non-binding factors that the court should consider, such as
the “general importance of the question presented” and the “exis231
tence of a conflict.” Similarly, in Minnesota, a statute delineates factors that its court “should” take into account when deciding whether
to grant a petition for further review, including the importance of the
232
question and whether a statute has been held unconstitutional, but
these factors are merely “intended to be instructive” and are “neither
233
234
mandatory nor exclusive.”
Hawaii presents a similar situation.
This highlights the need to look to other more indirect forms of constraint in the certiorari context, just as other more indirect forms of
constraint have been instrumental in controlling delegated discretion
in the administrative law arena.
B. Mandating Disclosure to Enable Greater Transparency and Monitoring
An alternative means of reining in the Court’s discretion and
enabling greater oversight and transparency would be for Congress to
mandate—or for the Court to voluntarily impose upon itself—some
kind of disclosure requirements. Two possible disclosure requirements are considered here: (1) requiring the Court to explain the
reasons behind certiorari decisions; and (2) requiring disclosure of
the Justices’ certiorari votes. Ultimately, this Section concludes that
although a full-blown reason-giving requirement is unlikely to succeed, vote-disclosure requirements seem more feasible.
230

See Gerald B. Cope, Jr., Discretionary Review of the Decisions of Intermediate Appellate
Courts: A Comparison of Florida’s System With Those of the Other States and the Federal System,
45 FLA. L. REV. 21, 23 (1993) (noting that the “majority of state appellate court systems
consist of two tiers: a court of last resort, usually called the supreme court, and an intermediate appellate court, usually called the courts of appeals” and explaining that
“[o]ne of the hallmarks of a two-tier appellate court system is discretionary supreme
court review”). One notable outlier is Florida. In Florida, the state constitution sets
forth specific criteria for discretionary review in a fairly restrictive manner. See id. at 48
(noting that “Florida’s system runs counter to prevailing practice, in that the supreme
court’s constitutional categories are not guidelines, but are jurisdictional limitations”).
231
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 20-3018(b) (2010).
232
MINN. STAT. § 480A.10 (2010).
233
MINN. R. CIV. APP. P. 117 comment (1983). See generally Peter S. Popovich &
Erin Leigh Miller, Obtaining Review in the Minnesota Supreme Court, 14 HAMLINE L. REV.
117, 131-32 (1990) (noting that in spite of the enumerated factors, “the granting of
review is entirely discretionary”).
234
See HAW. REV. STAT. § 602-59 (2010) (noting that the “acceptance or rejection
of [a petition for review] shall be discretionary upon the supreme court”); State v. Bolosan, 890 P.2d 673, 676 n.5 (Haw. 1995) (noting that the legislative history makes
clear that the court’s review is discretionary).

WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/17/2011 11:46 AM

Constraining Certiorari

47

1. Imposing a Reason-Giving Requirement
Reason-giving requirements used in administrative law suggest
one potential way of constraining certiorari. Imposing a similar requirement on the Court’s certiorari decisions would likely help ensure
235
greater transparency, facilitate monitoring, and promote greater
236
consistency.
Without analogizing to administrative law, a few scholars—
including one writing shortly after the passage of the Judges’ Bill—
have considered the possibility of requiring the Court to explain its
237
certiorari decisions. This kind of reform, however, would likely face
numerous legal and practical hurdles.
First, it might not be feasible for the Court to explain all of its certiorari decisions. Various Justices have indicated that it would be
plainly impractical for the Court to do so. For example, in 1950 when
the Court acted on approximately 1500 certiorari petitions per term,
Justice Frankfurter explained that “it would not be feasible to give reasons, however brief, for refusing to take” cases because the “time that
238
would be required” would be “prohibitive.”
Similarly, writing in
1977 when the Court heard about 150 out of 4000 cases per term,
then-Justice Rehnquist suggested that “there simply is not the time
239
available to formulate statements of reasons why review is denied.”
Today, concerns about the time-intensive nature of explaining certiorari decisions would likely be even more acute given that the Court
240
now receives approximately 8000 or 9000 petitions per term.
While it might seem that issuing a brief order stating that a certain
certiorari petition was denied because it is “splitless and factbound” or
because it alleges the “misapplication of a properly stated rule of law”
235

Cf. Shapiro, supra note 78, at 125 (“[M]ore transparency about cert decisions
would encourage both public and internal discussion to focus more on the cert criteria
themselves . . . .”).
236
Cf. Schauer, supra note 211, at 641 (stating that “to provide a reason for a decision is to include that decision within a principle of greater generality than the decision itself” (emphasis omitted)).
237
See Frank D. Moore, Right of Review by Certiorari to the Supreme Court, 17 GEO. L.J.
307, 308 (1929) (suggesting that “the court should assign briefly its reasons for its
denial”); see also Shapiro, supra note 78, at 125 (stating that the Court “publicly
shar[ing] more information about the reasons it does or does not grant cert in particular cases” would result in greater transparency).
238
Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918 (1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari).
239
William H. Rehnquist, Sunshine in the Third Branch, 16 WASHBURN L.J. 559,
561 (1977).
240
See supra note 72 and accompanying text.
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would not take that much time, this may not be true. For the most
part, the Justices act on their own—without the benefit of collegial
discussion—when deciding which cases merit discussion as a group,
and even those certiorari petitions that are deemed worthy of group
241
discussion receive fairly perfunctory discussion at conference. Given
that certiorari decisions tend to be made individually, it seems likely
that different Justices might have different reasons for granting or de242
nying certain petitions.
Accordingly, it might be quite difficult for
the Court to quickly formulate any kind of unified certiorari explana243
tions.
Second, it might be argued that reason-giving requirements are
most applicable to decisions that are driven by legal or technocratic
factors and less applicable to highly discretionary decisions driven by
244
strategic or political concerns. This argument might appear to find
some support in the notion that certain agency actions—namely,
those that are “committed to agency discretion by law,” such as nonenforcement decisions—are not subject to judicial review under the
APA and hence are not subject to a judicially enforced reason-giving
245
requirement. Essentially, the argument is that if actions committed
entirely to agency discretion (and not constrained by legal principles)
are not subject to a reason-giving requirement, then the Supreme
Court’s highly discretionary certiorari decisions should not be either.
This argument against a reason-giving requirement in the certiorari context, however, is not fatal. First, when a petition seeking a
rulemaking proceeding or a petition seeking the initiation of an enforcement action is filed with an agency and is denied, the agency
241

See Cordray & Cordray, Philosophy of Certiorari, supra note 7, at 398-99 (describing how the Justices act individually, without collective discussion, during the certiorari
process).
242
See Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. at 918 (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of
certiorari) (“[D]ifferent reasons not infrequently move different members of the Court
in concluding that a particular case at a particular time makes review undesirable.”).
243
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 328 (noting that “since there are so many
petitions denied each term and since there are so many differing, individual reasons
that can underlie a denial in a particular case,” spelling out the reasons for certiorari
decisions has become “impracticable”).
244
Cf. Thomas E. Baker, Siskel and Ebert at the Supreme Court, 87 MICH. L. REV. 1472,
1494 (1989) (“I believe that the case selection process is, and should be, as much a political process as decisions on the merits.”); Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1718-26 (suggesting that certiorari decisions “frequently operate[] in the area of will and not law”).
245
See 5 U.S.C. § 701(a) (2006) (rendering agency action “committed to agency
discretion by law” nonreviewable); see also Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 828-32
(1985) (holding that nonenforcement decisions are generally not judicially reviewable
because they are committed to agency discretion).
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must provide a brief explanation for the denial. Thus, not all agency action committed to agency discretion is exempted from the rea247
son-giving requirement. Second, the main reason that some agency
action committed to agency discretion is exempted from judicial review (and hence by implication from a judicially enforced reasongiving requirement) is not that it would be undesirable for agencies to
explain the reasoning behind their discretionary actions. Rather,
agency action committed entirely to agency discretion is exempted
from judicial review because there would be “no law” for the courts to
248
apply in reviewing entirely discretionary decisions, and such deci249
sions are left to politically accountable actors.
In the certiorari context, judicial review of the Court’s certiorari
decisions is never conducted by any other judicial body, and so there
would be no need for the Court to explain its certiorari decisions solely in legalistic terms capable of judicial review—other than perhaps
the Court’s own desire to publicly disprove the notion that certiorari
250
“frequently operates in the area of will and not law.”
Furthermore,
unlike in the administrative law world, where the availability of political
review can help to compensate for the unavailability of judicial review
in some circumstances (as in the nonenforcement setting), the Court’s
certiorari decisions are shielded not only from judicial review but also
from political review.
Finally, if a reason-giving requirement were to be imposed, there
is still the question of who would impose it. It seems highly unlikely
that the Justices would agree to voluntarily adopt such a requirement,
especially in light of statements made by various Justices, such as Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Frankfurter, suggesting that the Justices
believe that the Court simply does not have the time to explain its cer251
tiorari decisions.
246

See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
248
See S. REP. NO. 79-752, at 26 (1945) (suggesting that this exception to the APA
was meant to apply where “statutes are drawn in such broad terms that in a given case
there is no law to apply”).
249
Cf. Bressman, supra note 199, at 1659 (“Consistent with the accountability
theory, an agency’s failure to act should be subject to the scrutiny of politically accountable officials.”).
250
Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1725.
251
See supra notes 238-39 and accompanying text; see also Singleton v. Comm’r, 439
U.S. 940, 942-43 (1978) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of certiorari) (approving of
Justice Frankfurter’s view that “[p]ractical considerations preclude” the Court from
explaining its decisions (quoting Maryland v. Balt. Radio Show, 338 U.S. 912, 918
(1950) (Frankfurter, J., respecting the denial of certiorari))).
247
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So any reason-giving requirement would likely have to come from
Congress. Yet congressional attempts to impose a reason-giving requirement on the Court would almost certainly elicit constitutional
objections on separation of powers grounds. Support for a separation
of powers argument might appear to exist in Houston v. Williams, an
1859 opinion written by Justice Stephen Field when he was on the Cal252
ifornia Supreme Court.
In Houston, Justice Field held that a California statute, which required the state appellate courts to give reasons for their decisions in writing, violated California’s constitution by
253
improperly encroaching on the judiciary’s independence.
Specifically, Justice Field wrote:
If the Legislature can require the reasons of our decisions to be
stated in writing, it can forbid their statement in writing, and enforce
their oral announcement, or prescribe the paper upon which they shall
be written, and the ink which shall be used. And yet no sane man will
justify any such absurd pretension, but where is the limit to this power if
its exercise in any particular be admitted?
The truth is, no such power can exist in the Legislative Department,
or be sanctioned by any Court which has the least respect for its own
dignity and independence. In its own sphere of duties, this Court cannot be trammeled by any legislative restrictions. Its constitutional duty is
254
discharged by the rendition of decisions.

Part of what seemed to bother Justice Field about the statute’s imposition of an across-the-board reason-giving requirement is that it
would needlessly take up the court’s time and resources. “It is not
every case,” Justice Field wrote, “which will justify the expenditure of
255
time necessary to write an opinion.”
256
Other state courts, including the Supreme Court of Arkansas
257
and the Supreme Court of Indiana, have embraced Justice Field’s
reasoning in Houston. In addition, Houston was recently cited by Judge
252

13 Cal. 24 (1859).
Id. at 25. For an analysis of what happened post-Houston and the history surrounding a constitutional amendment that requires reasons for judicial opinions, see
People v. Kelly, 146 P.3d 547, 550-53 (Cal. 2006). See also CAL. CONST. art. VI, § 14
(“Decisions of the Supreme Court and courts of appeal that determine causes shall be
in writing with reasons stated.”).
254
Houston, 13 Cal. at 25.
255
Id. at 26.
256
See Vaughan v. Harp, 4 S.W. 751, 752-53 (Ark. 1887) (concluding that the legislature has no authority to require the court to give written reasons for its decisions).
257
See In re Griffiths, 20 N.E. 513, 513-14 (Ind. 1889) (holding unconstitutional a
statutory provision requiring the Indiana Supreme Court to make a syllabus of each
opinion).
253
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Alex Kozinski in a statement to a congressional subcommittee cautioning Congress against intervening to address the issue of unpublished
258
judicial decisions. Hence, it seems that if Congress were to impose a
reason-giving requirement on the Court, those inclined to oppose the
requirement might well look to the separation of powers arguments
259
raised in Houston.
However, any arguments along these lines might well be overcome
simply by relying upon Article III, Section 2 of the U.S. Constitution,
which provides that the Court shall have appellate jurisdiction over
specified cases “with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the
260
Congress shall make.” In light of the Constitution’s grant of power to
Congress to make exceptions and to promulgate regulations governing the Court’s jurisdiction, it might be permissible for Congress to
delegate to the Court the power to decide which cases it will hear subject to the caveat that the Court must explain its decisions to decline
to exercise jurisdiction. In other words, it might be possible—
consistent with separation of powers principles—to say that Congress’s
decision to delegate its own legislative-like powers to the Court can
have certain strings attached, such as the requirement that the Court
explain itself in carrying out a role that Congress could have per-

258

Unpublished Judicial Decisions: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Courts, the Internet,
and Intellectual Prop. of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 16 (2002) (statement of
Judge Alex Kozinski).
259
Cf. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 614 (1995) (Souter, J., dissenting)
(suggesting that “an Act of Congress mandating long opinions from this Court” would be
“patently unconstitutional”).
260
U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 (emphasis added). Interestingly, some state constitutions explicitly give the states’ highest courts—not the state legislatures—the power to
promulgate rules defining the courts’ appellate jurisdiction. For example, the Illinois
Constitution, adopted in 1970, gives its supreme court the power to provide by court
rule for appeals other than appeals as of right specified in the federal or state constitution. ILL. CONST. art. 6, § 4(b)–(c). Similarly, the Kentucky Constitution declares that
in all but certain specified types of cases, “the Supreme Court shall exercise appellate
jurisdiction as provided by its rules.” KY. CONST. § 110(2)(b); see also IND. CONST. art.
7, § 4 (“The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction under such terms and
conditions as specified by rules except that appeals from a judgment imposing a sentence of death shall be taken directly to the Supreme Court.”); MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 4
(“The supreme court shall have . . . appellate jurisdiction as provided by rules of the
supreme court.”); VT. CONST. ch. II, § 30 (“The Supreme Court shall exercise appellate jurisdiction in all cases, criminal and civil, under such terms and conditions as it
shall specify in rules not inconsistent with law.”).
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formed itself. After all, this is similar to what Congress routinely does
261
when it hands legislative powers to administrative agencies.
In any event, this constitutional question might well be mere academic sport because of a serious practical hurdle that would likely get
in the way of any congressionally imposed reason-giving requirement:
the Court might choose to thumb its nose at Congress by providing
only very vague and general explanations in response to any such statute. The nub of the problem is quis custodiet ipsos custodes: who would
guard the guardians? The experiences of two states—Michigan and
Maryland—corroborate this concern.
A provision of the Michigan constitution mandates that the state’s
262
supreme court provide “reasons for each denial of leave to appeal.”
This constitutional provision came about as a result of a 1961–1962
constitutional convention through which Michigan created an intermediate appellate court and modified the state supreme court’s ap263
pellate jurisdiction, making it almost completely discretionary.
As
Maurice Kelman has detailed, “[p]revious Michigan constitutions directed the supreme court to issue explanatory opinions for all decisions,” but to the extent that the court enjoyed some discretionary jurisdiction prior to 1963, the court was not constitutionally required to
offer a public explanation for the discretionary decision to deny re264
view. Thus, when significant expansion of the state supreme court’s
discretionary jurisdiction was contemplated at the 1961–1962 constitutional convention, three delegates offered the Donnelly Amendment,
which proposed requiring the court to give “‘reasons for each denial
265
The delegate who proposed the amendment
of leave to appeal.’”
stated during the convention that she envisioned that this would simply require the court to provide a very short, concise statement of why

261

See 5 U.S.C. § 555(e) (2006) (requiring that notices of agency denial of applications be accompanied by “a brief statement of the grounds of denial”); id. § 706(2)(A)
(giving courts the power to review an agency decision for arbitrariness or capriciousness).
262
See MICH. CONST. art. VI, § 6 (“Decisions of the supreme court, including all
decisions on prerogative writs, shall be in writing and shall contain a concise statement of
the facts and reasons for each decision and reasons for each denial of leave to appeal.”).
263
See Maurice Kelman, Case Selection by the Michigan Supreme Court: The Numerology
of Choice, 1992 DETROIT C. L. REV. 1, 7 (describing the Convention’s actions to “create[]
an intermediate appellate court” and modify “the existing constitutional reference to the
supreme court’s appellate jurisdiction” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
264
Id. at 8-9.
265
Id. at 9 (emphasis omitted) (quoting MICH. CONST. art. 6, § 6).

WATTS_FINAL.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE)

2011]

11/17/2011 11:46 AM

Constraining Certiorari

53

leave was denied, for example, because the case raises “merely a ques266
tion of fact.”
Proponents of the Donnelly Amendment made various arguments
267
For example, one delegate
in support of the proposed provision.
argued that if the court considers a petition, “it must have arrived at a
rational basis for its decision to deny appeal, and if it has a rational basis there is no reason why it ought not say so in writing to the parties
268
who are appealing.”
Others suggested that published reasons for
denial would help provide guidance to litigants and attorneys about
269
which cases warrant appeal. Various points were raised in response,
including that requiring explanations would create an “insuperable
270
work load” for the court.
One delegate even quite presciently raised the possibility that no
one would be able to enforce the constitutional requirement against
the court:
MR. TUBBS: [Assuming] that the answer given by the court would be
something like this, “Appeal denied. Reasons, none.” Would that satisfy
this amendment?
....
MISS DONNELLY: Mr. Tubbs, I suggest that you as a member of the bar
are not serious in saying this.
MR. TUBBS: Let me ask you another question. . . . Now, this next opinion says “Appeal denied. Reasons, we do not like the brief filed for the
appellant.”
MISS DONNELLY: I like to use my first reasoning again. I don’t believe
they will do that, and I don’t think you do, either.
MR. TUBBS: Third question: suppose the supreme court issues an opinion “Appeal denied. No reasons.” Who and what will enforce the constitution?
CHAIRMAN VANDUSEN: Does the lady care to answer, Miss Donnelly?

266

STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL RECORD
1296 (Austin C. Knapp ed., 1962) (statement of Del. Donnelly).
267
See Kelman, supra note 263, at 9-10 (summarizing arguments made in favor of
the amendment).
268
STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL RECORD,
supra note 266, at 1297 (statement of Del. Norris).
269
Id. at 1295 (statement of Del. Donnelly); id. at 1297 (statement of Del. Ford).
270
Id. at 1302 (statement of Del. Prettie); see also Kelman, supra note 263, at 10
(summarizing other arguments made by critics of the amendment, including that a
statement of reasons for denial would blur the line between the merits of a case and
discretionary decisions about whether to exercise jurisdiction).
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MISS DONNELLY: I think you know the answer, Mr. Tubbs. Nothing
will. But if the supreme court will so violate that part of the constitution,
271
then we have a very, very serious problem in this state.
272

Just as Delegate Tubbs’ questions predicted,
the Donnelly
273
Amendment—after going into effect —failed to yield meaningful
explanations. In fact, in Michigan, “[a]ll that is filed in the clerk’s office and sent to the litigants is a standard form order filled in with the
title and docket number of the case” and accompanied by boilerplate
language stating that the court is “‘not persuaded that the question(s)
274
presented should be reviewed.’” Hence, as Kelman has pointed out
in an article criticizing the Michigan court, the court is effectively ignor275
ing the requirement set forth in the state’s constitution.
Maryland’s experience with a reason-giving requirement is quite
similar. A Maryland state statute provides that its highest court (the
Maryland Court of Appeals), which can grant review when the court
determines it is “desirable and in the public interest,” shall provide
276
the “reasons for the denial of the writ . . . in writing.”
As in Michigan, the requirement has not resulted in illuminating explanations of
certiorari denials. Rather, the Court of Appeals will generally issue
nothing more than formulaic language to the effect that the petition
is “denied as there has been no showing that review by certiorari is de277
sirable and in the public interest.”
271

STATE OF MICHIGAN CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION 1961 OFFICIAL RECORD,
supra note 266, at 1304 (statements of Del. Tubbs and Del. Donnelly).
272
See Kelman, supra note 263, at 12 (“The palm for prescience goes to Mr. Tubbs,
not Ms. Donnelly.”).
273
MICH. CONST. art VI, § 6.
274
Kelman, supra note 263, at 12; see also, e.g., Morrill v. St. Joseph Cnty. Road
Comm., 699 N.W.2d 698, 698 (Mich. 2005) (denying application for leave to appeal
“because we are not persuaded that the questions presented should be reviewed by this
court”). This is the case despite the existence of a court rule suggesting that reasons
will be given. See MICH. CT. R. 7.321 (“The reasons for denying leave to appeal, required by Const 1963, art 6, § 6 and filed in the clerk’s office, are not to be published,
and are not to be regarded as precedent.”).
275
Kelman, supra note 263, at 12-13 (stating that the process “is utterly uninformative and a far cry from the statement of reasons the Constitutional Convention directed
the court to give”).
276
MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 12-203 (LexisNexis 2006).
277
E.g., Johnson v. Baker, 562 A.2d 151 (Md. 1989); Smith v. Graymar Co., 468
A.2d 624 (Md. 1983); Taylor v. Benjamin, 468 A.2d 624 (Md. 1983); Moats v. Estate of
Pumphrey, 366 A.2d 1047 (Md. 1976); see also William L. Reynolds, II, The Court of Appeals of Maryland: Roles, Work and Performance, 37 MD. L. REV. 1, 15 (1977) (noting that
the standard wording of an order denying certiorari simply provides in an unrevealing
manner that “there has been no showing that review by certiorari is desirable and in
the public interest”); cf. William J. Murphy & John J. Connolly, Petitions for Certiorari—
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Perhaps it could be argued that the U.S. Supreme Court would be
less able than Maryland and Michigan state courts to effectively ignore
a reason-giving requirement because the Court stands at the pinnacle
of our nation’s legal system and faces intense public scrutiny through
a variety of avenues, including legal blogs that might keep the Court
278
honest. However, further evidence suggesting that a congressionally
mandated reason-giving requirement might face serious hurdles can
be found by looking at the Court’s reactions to past congressional attempts to mandate that the Court hear certain cases. Prior to the
279
1988 Act, which eliminated most of the Court’s mandatory jurisdiction, the Court disposed of many mandatory appeals summarily without full briefing and oral argument and without issuing a full opi280
nion.
The Court effectively thwarted Congress’s intent by taking
summary action before argument, such as summary affirmances and
281
summary dismissals.
In short, with no means of enforcing a reason-giving requirement
against the Court, the success of any such requirement would likely
depend on the receptiveness of the Court. Given that it seems quite
unlikely that the Court would look kindly upon a congressional
mandate or would voluntarily impose such a requirement on itself,
other mechanisms for constraining the Court’s certiorari jurisdiction
warrant consideration.
2. Requiring Disclosure of Certiorari Votes
Rather than importing administrative law’s reason-giving requirement wholesale into the certiorari context, one less intrusive and
much more promising means of forcing an alternative kind of disclosure might simply be to require publication of the Court’s votes on
282
certiorari petitions. This could be a backdoor way of obtaining reaView From the Bar, in APPELLATE PRACTICE FOR THE MARYLAND LAWYER: STATE AND
FEDERAL 351 (Paul Mark Sandler & Andrew D. Levy eds., 3d ed. 2007) (noting that the
judges on the Court of Appeals “rarely publish specific reasons why certiorari was either
granted or denied in particular cases”).
278
See, e.g., SCOTUSBLOG, http://www.scotusblog.com (last visited Oct. 15, 2011)
(covering the Supreme Court, often with multiple posts per day).
279
See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
280
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 364 (noting that “[i]n the 1981 and 1982
Terms, for example, 85 percent and 92 percent of the appeals from state courts, and 45
percent and 40 percent of the appeals from federal courts” were summarily dismissed).
281
Id.
282
The possibility of calling for vote disclosure was mentioned by Doris Provine in
1980. See PROVINE, supra note 22, at 177 (“Interested persons should have access to
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sons for some of the Court’s certiorari decisions since the Justices—
knowing that their certiorari votes would be made public and fearing
that their votes could be misread as a reflection on the merits of the
case—might be more inclined to choose on their own initiative to ex283
plain their certiorari votes in certain cases.
For example, a Justice
might opt to write an explanation of a vote to deny a petition by noting that jurisdictional defects in the petition precluded a vote to grant
but that the substantive issues raised in the petition warrant review in
a future case, thereby signaling to the outside world that the Justice is
interested in the merits of the issue raised.
A vote-disclosure requirement also might be a way of encouraging
the Justices to rely less on their law clerks for petition screening and to
284
After all, the Juspay more careful attention to certiorari petitions.
tices’ own names would be publicly attached to certiorari decisions at
the time the decisions are made rather than (as is the case under our
current system) years or decades after the fact when a retired colleagues’ papers are made public. In addition, publication of the discuss list might help to cut down on frivolous filings. An attorney
might be reluctant to recommend that a client spend money on a certiorari petition if the attorney knew that the client would ultimately
learn that no Justice on the Court voted to grant certiorari.
Perhaps even more importantly, a vote-disclosure requirement
could be used to facilitate public oversight and political monitoring,
just as transparency in administrative decisionmaking facilitates political control and oversight. Specifically, Congress could use votedisclosure information to consider whether (and how) to revise the
285
Court’s jurisdictional statutes.
In addition, both the President and
voting data that will enable them to piece together the considerations the Court takes
into account in deciding cases.”).
283
See id. (“Publication of votes might indeed encourage some justices to write
opinions justifying their case-selection votes, but this is an insufficient argument
against any disclosure at any time.”); cf. Steve Albert, The Ninth Circuit’s Secret Ballot:
Some Judges Want to Reconsider the Private Nature of Votes for En Banc Review, RECORDER
(S.F.), Mar. 3, 1995, at 1 (noting that some judges in the Ninth Circuit worry that if en
banc votes were publicly revealed, “their votes could be misread as reflecting their
judgments on the merits of a case”).
284
Cf. Shapiro, supra note 78, at 116-29 (discussing concerns about the role that
clerks play in the certiorari process).
285
Congress could receive assistance in analyzing the “real-time” voting data from
scholars who already mine the papers of retired Justices to try to piece together clues
about how the Court has handled certiorari petitions in the past. See, e.g., Cordray &
Cordray, Strategy in Supreme Court Case Selection, supra note 7, at 29 (“By comparing the
Justices’ voting alignments on certiorari to their voting alignments on the merits in
granted cases, we saw strong evidence that there is a significant merits-oriented com-
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the Senate could use the information to put the spotlight on certiorari
in the confirmation process and to take nominees’ views on certiorari
286
into account when nominating and confirming Justices.
Two possible means of requiring vote disclosure are considered
here: (a) requiring disclosure of those certiorari petitions that fail to
make the Court’s discuss list; and (b) requiring disclosure of the Justices’ votes on all other certiorari petitions. Whether imposed by
Congress or by the Court itself, these kinds of vote-disclosure requirements offer a promising mechanism to increase transparency
and improve public monitoring of the Court.
a. Votes on Petitions That Fail to Make the Discuss List
Requiring public disclosure of those certiorari petitions that are
automatically denied without discussion would be an easy way to shed
some light on the certiorari process and enable greater monitoring.
Unlike a reason-giving requirement, such disclosure would not impose
a time-consuming burden on the Justices. Since the Court already internally tracks which cases make the discuss list and which do not, it
ponent in the Justices’ decisionmaking on certiorari.”); Kevin H. Smith, Certiorari and
the Supreme Court Agenda: An Empirical Analysis, 54 OKLA. L. REV. 727, 766 (2001) (finding that over half of the cases eliminated through the certiorari process either raised a
“frivolous” question, did not have an opinion on the merits from the court immediately
below the Supreme Court, or involved a pro se petitioner); Nancy C. Staudt, Agenda
Setting in Supreme Court Tax Cases: Lessons from the Blackmun Papers, 52 BUFF. L. REV. 889,
892 (2004) (investigating Justice Blackmun’s papers to determine “the factors that explain the Supreme Court’s decision to grant certiorari to federal tax controversies”).
286
In recent confirmation proceedings, certiorari has surfaced but generally has
played only a bit part. For example, Justice Sonia Sotomayor was asked whether she
would join the cert pool and whether she would have granted certiorari in a particular
case that the Court denied. See Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of Hon. Sonia
Sotomayor, to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before
the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 438, 440 (2009). In addition, Justice Elena
Kagan was asked whether she would grant certiorari in specific cases, and she was
asked what factors would motivate her certiorari grants. See The Nomination of Elena Kagan to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States: Hearing Before the S.
Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 78, 248-50 (2010). Justice Kagan was also asked
about a certiorari memo she wrote as a law clerk to Justice Marshall in which she cautioned the Justice against granting in the case because “the Court might create some
very bad law on abortion and/or prisoners’ rights.” Id. at 107. Chief Justice John Roberts was asked how he would decide “which cases will make the cut and will be heard
by the Supreme Court” and what would guide his “complete discretion to choose
which cases to hear.” Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of John G. Roberts, Jr. to be
Chief Justice of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong.
336 (2005). Justice Alito was asked whether he would join the cert pool. Confirmation
Hearing on the Nomination of Samuel A. Alito, Jr. to be an Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of
the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. 394 -95 (2006).
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would be quite simple for the Court to release a list of certiorari petitions that were denied without receiving conference discussion. If the
Court were to disclose all cases that fail to make the discuss list, it
would, by negative inference, also disclose those cases that did make
the discuss list.
Certainly, the mere disclosure of those petitions that fail to make
the discuss list would not enable the outside world to learn why certain
cases did or did not warrant discussion, but such disclosure would reveal—in a minimally intrusive manner—which petitions yielded discussion and which did not, as well as precisely how many petitions fail
to yield any conference discussion in a given year. Accordingly, Court
watchers and Congress alike would gain valuable information about
how the Court is exercising its discretion.
Such a disclosure requirement would not be unheard of in the
judicial realm, but rather finds an analog in various federal courts of
287
appeals’ en banc procedures. Much like petitions for certiorari filed
with the U.S. Supreme Court, petitions for rehearing en banc filed
with the courts of appeals are often denied, and rarely even result in a
288
judge requesting a vote on the petition. Notably, three different circuit courts have chosen to adopt rules or internal procedures that
provide that orders denying petitions for rehearing en banc shall note
when no member of the circuit court requests a poll on the petition.
In the Fourth Circuit, for example, if no judge requests a poll on a petition for rehearing en banc, then “the panel’s order on a petition for
rehearing will bear the notation that no member of the Court re289
quested a poll.” Similarly, in the Fifth Circuit, when no judge makes
a request for a poll, “the panel’s order denying the petition for re290
hearing en banc must show no poll was requested.” In the Eleventh
287

Petitions for rehearing en banc filed in the courts of appeals are similar to petitions for certiorari filed with the U.S. Supreme Court in that both are discretionary
instead of mandatory. However, they are also quite different in that a court of appeals
that decides to hear a case en banc has already heard the case, whereas a petition for
certiorari requests the Supreme Court to review the case for the first time. And further, when the Supreme Court is faced with a petition for certiorari on appeal from a
state court, the Supreme Court is deciding whether any federal judges shall exercise
the federal judicial power in the case at all.
288
See, e.g., Pierre H. Bergeron, En Banc Practice in the Sixth Circuit, 68 TENN. L.
REV. 771, 780 (2001) (discussing the statistical improbability of obtaining en banc review in the Sixth Circuit).
289
4TH CIR. R. 35(b).
290
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT, RULES AND INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
34 -36 (2011), available at http://www.ca5.uscourts.gov/clerk/docs/5thCir-IOP.pdf.
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Circuit, if no poll is requested, then “the panel must enter an order
denying the petition for rehearing en banc showing no poll was re291
quested by any judge of the court in regular active service.” Hence,
these three circuits’ en banc rules establish some judicial receptiveness to the notion of vote disclosure and suggest a model that could be
very useful in thinking about how to mandate disclosure of the Court’s
discuss list.
b. Votes on All Petitions or All Denied Petitions
Alternatively, the Court could be required to disclose the Justices’
votes on more than just the subset of petitions that fail to make the
discuss list. This could be done by either requiring the Justices to disclose their votes on all denied petitions (not just those petitions that are
automatically denied because they fail to make the discuss list), or by
requiring the Justices to disclose their votes on all petitions regardless
of whether the petition is granted or denied. A major advantage of
vote disclosure on all petitions is that it would be easier for those external to the Court, including Congress, to monitor the Court’s certiorari decisions and to piece together possible voting patterns. One
possible disadvantage, however, of disclosing votes on all petitions
might be that if certiorari votes were disclosed at the time certiorari
was granted, then litigants in granted cases might try to tailor their
merits arguments to certain Justices based on a “tea leaf” reading of
292
the certiorari votes.
This problem could be avoided, however, by
waiting to disclose certiorari votes on granted petitions until the case
293
is decided on the merits. Alternatively, a vote-disclosure requirement
could be limited to denied petitions.
At the en banc level, the Fourth Circuit’s local rules provide a useful example of requiring vote disclosure for all denials. In the Fourth
Circuit, not only will an order on a petition for rehearing that fails to
yield a request for a poll “bear the notation that no member of the
291

U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT, ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
RULES AND INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES No. 5, at 147 (2011), available at
http://www.ca11.uscourts.gov/documents/pdfs/BlueAUG11.pdf.
292
Another potential disadvantage of requiring the Justices to disclose their votes
on petitions that make the discuss list is that such a requirement might disincentivize
the Justices from putting certiorari petitions on the discuss list in the first place. This
could militate in favor of only requiring disclosure of those cases that fail to make the
discuss list.
293
See FALLON ET AL., supra note 18, at 1482 n.18 (questioning whether, if Provine’s suggestion of vote disclosure were adopted, disclosure of votes on a grant of certiorari should “be deferred until the case has been disposed of”).
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294

Court requested a poll,” but also if a poll is requested on a petition
and rehearing en banc is denied, then “the order will reflect the vote
295
of each participating judge.”
Some other useful examples can be found at the state level. In
Arizona, for example, Rule 23(h) of Arizona’s Rules of Civil Appellate
Procedure provides: “If the Supreme Court denied review, its order
shall specify those justices of the Supreme Court, if any, who voted to
296
grant review.”
This rule, accordingly, embraces the notion of vote
297
disclosure in cases where review is denied. Similarly, in California, a
court rule also calls for vote disclosure on petitions for review, but unlike the rule in Arizona, it focuses on disclosure of votes in cases where
review is granted. Specifically, this rule provides: “An order granting
review must be signed by at least four justices; an order denying review
298
may be signed by the Chief Justice alone.”
Thus, if one wants to
learn which members of the California Supreme Court voted to grant
review in a particular granted case, one need only look to the court’s
294

4TH CIR. R. 35(b).
Id. This differs from the en banc rules of some other circuits that allow (but do
not require) judges to disclose their en banc votes in certain circumstances. See U.S.
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE D.C. CIRCUIT, HANDBOOK OF PRACTICE AND INTERNAL
PROCEDURES 57 (2011), available at http://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/internet/home.nsf/
content/Court+Rules+and+Operating+Procedures (follow “Handbook of Practice and
Internal Procedures” hyperlink) (“An order granting rehearing en banc does not indicate the names of the judges who voted against rehearing, but an order denying rehearing en banc does indicate the names of the judges who voted to grant rehearing
en banc, if they wish.” (emphasis omitted)); U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD
CIRCUIT, INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT ch. 9.5.8, at 13 (2002), available at http://
www.ca3.uscourts.gov/Rules/IOP-Final.pdf (“If there is a dissent from the denial of
rehearing and no dissenting opinion is filed, a notation will be added to the dispositive
order, at the affirmative request of the dissenting judge, that ‘Judge ___ would grant
rehearing by the court en banc.’ Any active judge may file an opinion sur denial of the
petition and direct its publication.”). The Fourth Circuit rule also stands in sharp contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s procedures, which expressly provide that orders denying or
granting en banc consideration will not specify the vote tally. See 9TH CIR. R. 35-1 to 353 advisory committee note 2.
296
ARIZ. R. CIV. APP. P. 23(h).
297
See, e.g., State v. Johnson, No. CR-09-0256-PR, 2010 Ariz. LEXIS 8 (Ariz. Feb. 4,
2010) (denying petition for review and noting that “Chief Justice Berch and Justice
Bales voted to grant review on issue 2”), denying review to 207 P.3d 804 (Ariz. Ct. App.
2009); State v. Gum, No. CR-07-0176-PR, 2007 Ariz. LEXIS 114 (Ariz. Sept. 25, 2007)
(denying review but noting that “Justice Hurwitz voted to grant review”), denying review
to 153 P.3d 418 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2007); Performance Funding, L.L.C. v. Ariz. Pipe Trade
Trust Funds, No. CV-02-0240-PR, 2002 Ariz. LEXIS 215 (Ariz. Dec. 4, 2002) (denying
review but noting that “Chief Justice Jones voted to grant review”), denying review to 49
P.3d 293 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2002).
298
CAL. R. CT. 8.512(d)(1).
295
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300

minutes, which indicate which justices voted to grant the petition.
The justices in California are also free to note their votes in cases that
are denied review, but court rules do not mandate vote disclosure in
301
the case of denials as opposed to grants.
The fact that some federal and state courts have chosen to promulgate court rules imposing vote-disclosure requirements suggests that
it might not be all that unrealistic to believe that the U.S. Supreme
Court would be willing to do so as well. Alternatively, a vote-disclosure
requirement could come from Congress. Congressional action along
these lines might raise separation of powers questions similar to those
that would be raised if Congress considered imposing a traditional
reason-giving requirement on the Court. However, as discussed
above, any such separation of powers concerns might be surmountable in light of Article III’s textual grant of power to Congress to make
302
regulations governing the Court’s jurisdiction.
Furthermore, any
concerns that might flow from separation of powers principles would
seem to be less significant in the vote-disclosure context than in the
traditional reason-giving context. Unlike a full-blown reason-giving
requirement, vote disclosure would not require significant time or resources and hence could not as easily be said to unduly interfere with
303
the Court’s ability to carry out its judicial functions.
Nonetheless,
even if Congress could impose a vote-disclosure requirement on the
Court without violating separation of powers principles, it would seem
preferable to have the Court voluntarily impose the requirement on
itself in order to maximize judicial compliance with the requirement.

299

See Lawrence Baum, Decisions to Grant and Deny Hearings in the California Supreme
Court: Patterns in Court and Individual Behavior, 16 SANTA CLARA L. REV. 713, 716 (1976).
300
California makes the court’s meeting minutes available online. Minutes: Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal, CAL. CTS., http://www.courtinfo.ca.gov/cgibin/
minutes.cgi (select “Supreme Court” from the dropdown menu) (last visited Oct. 15,
2011).
301
SUPREME COURT OF CAL., THE SUPREME COURT OF CALIFORNIA pt. IV.I (2007),
available at http://www.courts.ca.gov/documents/2007_Supreme_Court_Booklet.pdf
(“In any case in which the petition, application, or motion is denied, a justice may request that his or her vote be recorded in the court minutes.”).
302
See supra notes 252-61 and accompanying text.
303
See Houston v. Williams, 13 Cal. 24, 26 (1859) (striking down a reason-giving
requirement in part because the requirement would needlessly take up the court’s
time and resources).
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C. Enabling Greater Public Participation
One final means of reforming the Court’s certiorari discretion
would seek to enable greater public participation in the certiorari
process by analogizing to public participation mechanisms that exist
in the administrative law world. The goal certainly would not be to
move the certiorari process to a full-blown notice-and-comment rulemaking model, which is cumbersome and can take years to com304
plete.
Rather, the goal would be to increase the opportunity for
participation by knowledgeable outsiders through greater invited and
uninvited amicus curiae participation and through greater use of “certification,” which allows the lower federal courts to certify questions of
305
law to the Court for resolution.
Currently, the primary sources that the Court looks to when making certiorari decisions are the written briefs filed by the petitioner
seeking certiorari, any brief in opposition filed by the respondent, and
306
the opinions below. Certiorari decisions are thus based primarily on
information presented to the Court in the parties’ briefs through a
fairly closed judicial process. This highlights how Congress has removed important questions about what kinds of cases the Court
should hear from the usual legislative arena where public participation and open deliberation can easily occur. It also highlights how the
Court must make certiorari decisions based on limited information
regarding the importance of the case. Enabling greater participation
by knowledgeable outsiders in the certiorari process could help to
open up the process to greater public awareness and deliberation.
Moreover, encouraging greater public participation could help
reduce the risk of “capture” of the Court by the expert Supreme Court
307
As Richard Lazarus has demonstrated, expert Supreme Court
bar.
304

See Julia Kobick, Negotiated Rulemaking: The Next Step in Regulatory Innovation at
the Food and Drug Administration?, 65 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 425, 431 (2010) (noting that
notice-and-comment rulemaking can take several years to complete).
305
See 28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006) (giving the Court jurisdiction to review cases in the
court of appeals via certification).
306
Respondents do not always provide the Court with a written brief opposing certiorari. See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 508 (noting that respondents can choose
to “waive the right to oppose a petition”).
307
See Lazarus, supra note 11, at 90 (describing the increasing influence of the Supreme Court bar); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Advocacy Matters Before and Within the Supreme Court: Transforming the Court by Transforming the Bar, 96 GEO. L.J. 1487, 1562-64
(2008) (highlighting the influence of the Supreme Court bar and urging reform from
both the bar and the Court); Joseph W. Swanson, Experience Matters: The Rise of a Supreme Court Bar and Its Effect on Certiorari, 9 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 175, 203 (2007)
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advocates were responsible for 53.8% of the petitions granted plenary
review during the 2007 Term—a number that has steadily increased
308
from only 5.8% of plenary grants in the 1980 Term. These statistics,
according to Lazarus, raise “the very real possibility that the Court’s
plenary docket is increasingly captured by an elite group of expert
Supreme Court advocates, dominated by those in the private bar” who
“know best how to influence the decisionmaking of the Justices at the
309
jurisdictional stage.”
1. Invited Amici Briefs
One potential way of increasing the opportunity for broader public participation at the certiorari stage involves encouraging “the Justices to be more willing at the jurisdictional stage to seek input from
those outside the Court who are knowledgeable about the issues
310
raised by a pending petition.”
It is well established that the Court
can reach out and invite the views of those who are not involved in the
311
case at the certiorari stage, but to date the Court has used this power
almost exclusively to invite the views of the Solicitor General (“SG”)
through what is known as a “CVSG”—an order that “calls for the views
312
of the Solicitor General.”
There is room, then, for the Court to
reach out to others at the certiorari stage.
For example, the Court might invite the views of states at the certiorari stage, or might invite the views of advocacy organizations with
expertise relating to the issues raised by the petition, such as the ACLU
or the AFL-CIO. Since the SG’s office generally presents the views of
the executive branch, the Court might also invite the views of members of the legislative branch in certain cases. Unlike the executive
branch, which is headed unilaterally by the President, Congress—with
(“[C]ertain experienced practitioners enjoy disproportionate success in crossing the
Court’s [certiorari] threshold.”).
308
Lazarus, supra note 11, at 90.
309
Id. at 89.
310
Id. at 96.
311
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 516-17 (noting that the Court typically
reaches out for the opinion of the United States or a state). See generally David C.
Thompson & Melanie F. Wachtell, An Empirical Analysis of Supreme Court Certiorari Petition Procedures: The Call for Response and the Call for the Views of the Solicitor General, 16
GEO. MASON L. REV. 237, 242 (2009) (discussing the Court’s ability to invite the views
of those outside the Court at the certiorari stage).
312
See GRESSMAN ET AL., supra note 3, at 516-17 & n.178; cf. John F. Duffy, The Federal Circuit in the Shadow of the Solicitor General, 78 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 518, 525 (2010)
(noting that CVSGs have been used by the Court at the certiorari stage to invite the
Solicitor General’s views for about a half century now).
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its many members—might well face institutional difficulties if trying to
313
formulate a unified, institutional response to an invitation.
However, groups of Congressmen or subcommittees might be able to come
together to bring a legislative perspective to the table, even if it fell
short of representing the views of the legislative branch as a whole.
In terms of invitations to nongovernmental amici, the Justices
might hesitate because of concerns about imposing a financial burden
on the invited amici. However, these concerns could be significantly
reduced if the Court allowed invited amici to forego printing their
briefs in booklet format and instead allowed them to file on standardsized paper, which the Court already allows in forma pauperis filers to
314
do. Alternatively, the Court could cover the printing costs of invited
amici.
2. Uninvited Amici Briefs
Besides relying solely upon additional invited amicus briefs to increase public participation in the certiorari process, another means of
enabling greater input would be to encourage the increased filing of
uninvited amicus briefs by interested organizations. Court rules allow
interested organizations or individuals to file amicus curiae briefs either supporting or opposing certiorari if the brief is accompanied by
315
the written consent of all parties, or if the Court grants leave to file.
316
Although certiorari-stage amicus briefs are on the rise, most certi317
orari petitions today are unaccompanied by amicus briefs.
Thus,
the increased filing of amicus briefs by interested and knowledgeable
organizations might well serve as a useful means of boosting broader
public participation and deliberation in the certiorari process and

313

Cf., e.g., INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 929 n.4 (1983) (noting that briefs were
filed by the Senate and the House of Representatives in the case but that “[n]ine
Members of the House of Representatives disagree with the position taken in the
briefs” and hence “filed a brief amici curiae”).
314
See SUP. CT. R. 39.3 (providing an exception to Rule 33.2, which allows in forma
pauperis filers to file on 8-1/2 by 11-inch paper, except when expressly provided).
Electronic filing might also be an option to consider.
315
SUP. CT. R. 37.2(a); see also SUP. CT. R. 37.1 (“An amicus curiae brief that brings
to the attention of the Court relevant matter not already brought to its attention by the
parties may be of considerable help to the Court.”).
316
See Tony Mauro & Marcia Coyle, To Get on the Argument Docket, It Helps to Have
Friends, NAT’L L.J. ( J uly 28, 2010), http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticlePrinter
FriendlyNLJ.jsp?id=1202463990959&slreturn=1.
317
See id. (noting that the Court still generally makes certiorari decisions based
only on filings from the petitioner and the respondent).
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318

bringing more diverse views to the table, as well as signaling public
319
interest in certain cases.
In thinking about roadblocks that might stand in the way of the
increased use of uninvited amicus briefs, one significant issue surfaces:
when certiorari petitions are filed, they are not made readily accessible to the public. The Court does not post pending certiorari petitions on the Court’s website. Those who are interested in monitoring
certiorari petitions generally must visit the Supreme Court in Washington, D.C.; use a subscription service like Westlaw, which now includes a certiorari petition database; or closely monitor legal blogs,
320
such as SCOTUSblog’s “Petitions to Watch” list. Hence, if uninvited
amicus briefs are to come from more than just the usual suspects at
the certiorari stage, then the Court might need to consider publicly
disseminating pending certiorari petitions free of charge on its website. Although this might sound like a difficult task, the creation of
websites like Regulations.gov, which was designed to increase transpa321
rency in the administrative law world, suggests that posting all pending certiorari petitions would be logistically feasible and that it might
322
Such a
fit within the government’s current focus on transparency.
move might also fit nicely with recent steps the Court has taken to
make itself more publicly accessible, such as its decision in 2010 to
publicly release audio transcripts from oral arguments the same week
323
as the argument via the Court’s website.
318

See, e.g., Eric Biber & Berry Brosi, Officious Intermeddlers or Citizen Experts? Petitions and Public Production of Information in Environmental Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 321,
377-84 (2010) (studying the role that citizen petitions and litigation play in driving the
environmental regulatory agenda and concluding that public participation might help
improve the performance of environmental agencies by collecting diffuse information
about environmental conditions).
319
Cf. Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Influence of Amicus Curiae Briefs
on the Supreme Court, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 743, 783 (2000) (“Political scientists have long
perceived an analogy between interest groups lobbying legislatures and interest groups
seeking to influence judicial decisions through the filing of amicus briefs.”).
320
See, e.g., Christa Culver, Petitions to Watch: Conference of September 26, 2011, SCOTUSBLOG (Sept. 2, 2011, 7:14 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/09/petitions-towatch-conference-of-september-26-2011-2/.
321
See REGULATIONS.GOV, supra note 187 (providing an online forum for citizens
to search, view, and comment on federal regulations).
322
See Transparency and Open Government: Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 4685, 4685 ( J an. 21, 2009) (explaining President Obama’s goal of governmental transparency within executive departments and agencies).
323
See Press Release, Supreme Court of the United States (Sept. 28, 2010), available
at http://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/press/viewpressreleases.aspx?FileName=
pr_09-28-10.html (“Beginning with October Term 2010, the audio recordings of all
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Alternatively, the Court might seek to increase amicus participation at the certiorari stage by publicly releasing the Court’s discuss list
a certain number of weeks prior to voting on the petitions to enable
interested amici to file briefs addressing whether certiorari should be
granted. This is somewhat analogous to the practice of some administrative agencies issuing advanced notices of proposed rulemaking or
soliciting dialogue from the public prior to engaging in rulemaking or
324
deciding petitions seeking rulemaking.
Of course, even if the Court did make certiorari-stage filings more
readily accessible or disseminate its discuss list in advance to enable
public response, additional hurdles still might stand in the way of
turning uninvited amicus briefs into a successful tool for meaningful
public participation. For example, the Court might not listen to the
uninvited amici. This concern seems quite plausible given that—
unlike in the administrative law context where the threat of judicial
review motivates agencies to respond in a reasoned manner to all significant comments—there would be no judicial enforcement mechanism to force the Court to take the amici views into account. Nonetheless, since the Court lacks the power to enforce its own judgments and
325
is in some ways beholden to public opinion, the Court might well
have an incentive to listen closely to meaningful comments filed by
326
amici about the importance of petitions, particularly in today’s interconnected world in which legal blogs increasingly keep tabs on the
327
Court and enable public discussion of the Court’s actions.
In addition, questions might arise concerning whether any uninvited amici would predominantly represent certain interest groups
rather than diverse public views. Similar concerns have arisen in traditional notice-and-comment rulemaking proceedings. Although several scholars have concluded that interest groups dominate the adminis-

oral arguments heard by the Supreme Court of the United States will be available free
to the public on the Court’s Web site, www.supremecourt.gov, at the end of each argument week.”).
324
See generally Barbara H. Brandon & Robert D. Carlitz, Online Rulemaking and
Other Tools for Strengthening Our Civil Infrastructure, 54 ADMIN. L. REV. 1421, 1465-70
(2002) (discussing agency efforts to obtain public input prior to rule proposals).
325
See supra note 185 and accompanying text.
326
See Abramowicz & Colby, supra note 14, at 970 (arguing in the context of a
proposal to inject notice-and-comment procedures into judicial decisionmaking on the
merits that “notice and comment might provide genuine constraint benefits even
without an enforcement mechanism” because “reputation may be a more powerful
motivator of judges than of administrative agency officials”).
327
See, e.g., SCOTUSBLOG, supra note 278.
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328

trative rulemaking process, others have found broad public partici329
pation in rulemakings. Furthermore, a recent study concluded that
in the environmental context, public participation might help to improve the performance of environmental agencies and their agendasetting decisions by collecting diffuse information about environmen330
tal conditions.
Hence, in the certiorari context, there is reason to
hope that increased uninvited amici participation would represent diverse public views rather than just the views of certain special interests.
3. Certification
A final way of broadening participation by knowledgeable outsiders
in the Court’s certiorari process would be to reinvigorate “certification.” Congress has enabled certification by empowering the Court to
hear cases from the courts of appeals via “certification at any time by a
court of appeals of any question of law in any civil or criminal case as
331
to which instructions are desired.” Despite the Justices’ promises to
332
rely upon certification when lobbying for the Judges’ Bill of 1925,
333
certification has “all but disappeared in recent decades.” Indeed, as
Justice Stevens recently noted, “The Court has accepted only a handful
of certified cases since the 1940s and none since 1981; it is a newswor334
thy event these days when a lower court even tries for certification.”
Amanda Tyler recently gave certification some much-needed attention, and her call for greater use of certification makes sense when
thinking about different mechanisms that might be used in the certi335
orari context to boost participation.
If certification were used with
greater regularity by the courts of appeals, it would enable more dialogue between the Court and courts of appeals judges who are well
328

See Biber & Brosi, supra note 318, at 328 n.27 (noting that most scholars conclude that interest groups dominate the rulemaking process).
329
See, e.g., Mariano-Florentino Cuéllar, Rethinking Regulatory Democracy, 57 ADMIN.
L. REV. 411, 460 (2005) (finding that comments from the lay public compose the vast
majority of total comments on some regulations).
330
See Biber & Brosi, supra note 318, at 377-84.
331
28 U.S.C. § 1254 (2006).
332
See Hartnett, supra note 1, at 1710 (“In the hearings on the Judges’ Bill, it was
repeatedly noted that the Supreme Court would not alone control its jurisdiction, but
that the courts of appeals, by use of certification, would share in that control.”).
333
United States v. Seale, 130 S. Ct. 12, 13 (2009) (Stevens, J., respecting the denial of the certified question).
334
Id.; see also Nielson, supra note 160, at 486-88 (detailing the decline of the
Court’s exercise of its certified question jurisdiction).
335
See Tyler, supra note 11, at 1326-28 (advocating a return to the use of certification).
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situated to know what areas of the law need clarification. Certification, accordingly, stands as an underutilized tool that could be used
with increasing frequency to achieve greater participation by knowledgeable outsiders during the certiorari process.
CONCLUSION
Concerned by the mix and number of cases the Court has been
taking, scholars studying the Court have been quick to propose some
fairly sweeping changes to certiorari. Some of these reforms would
take discretion away from the nine Justices on the Court and transfer
certiorari decisions to some other body or division. The recent Carrington and Cramton proposal, which calls for the creation of an entirely new certiorari division consisting of federal judges, is just one
336
such example.
This Article suggests that before the certiorari power is taken away
from the Court and placed elsewhere, some basic principles and doctrines found in administrative law should be consulted. After all, the
problem of confining discretion is not unique to judges, but rather is
an issue that administrative law has thought long and hard about. Although certiorari involves a delegation to the Court rather than to an
agency, the underlying concerns about accountability and reasoned
decisionmaking remain the same. In both contexts, congressional
delegations of broad discretionary power raise concerns about a deliberative and democratically accountable branch transferring power to
a less accountable body.
When some of administrative law’s lessons about how to constrain
delegated discretion are considered in the certiorari context, several
means of reforming certiorari—while leaving the Court with substantial discretion and flexibility—emerge. Specifically, vote-disclosure
requirements and increased public participation surface as promising
means of increasing transparency, deliberation, and accountability in
the certiorari process. These potential reforms deserve serious consideration from Congress and the Court.

336

Carrington & Cramton, supra note 12, at 591; see also Levinson, supra note 8, at
110-11 (examining the idea of creating a “certiorari court”).

